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A STUDY OF THE LAW OF EXPATRIATION
ABRAHAm SCHARF t
N the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, more than two
million American citizens had traveled outside the United
States, exclusive of Canada. Approximately one-half that
number made trips to Europe, Asia and South America.'
Similar numbers have traveled abroad in previous years.
As of March 31, 1963, the number of American citizens
registered as residing abroad totaled approximately 330,000. 3
In the past ten years, 49,133 American citizens have been
reported by consular officers as having lost American
nationality under our expatriation laws.4 It is not known
how many more have been confronted with the possibility
of loss of citizenship. Expatriation laws which affect so
many of our citizens merit close analysis.
American citizenship has been characterized as a priceless
possession 5 and, perhaps today, the most precious right
t LL.B., St. John's University; Assistant Regional Commissioner, Secur-
ity, Northeast Regional Office, United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The author ackmowledzes the invaluable assistance of Julius
Goldberg, Assistant District Director for Citizenship, New York, United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent
the official position of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
11962 ANN. REP. OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERvICE
Table 32.
21958-61 ANN. RPs. OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVIcE Table 32.
3These statistics were furnished by the United States Department of
State.
41962 ANN. REP. OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATuRALIZATION SERVICE
Table 51.
It should be noted that although there is a statutory distinction betveen
a national and a citizen, 'and between nationality and citizenship, it is not
significant for the purpose of this article, and these terms will be treated
synonomously. 66 Stat. 170 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (22) (1958).
5 Kletter v. Dulles, 111 F. Supp. 593, 598 (D.D.C. 1953), aff'd sub non.
Ketter v. Herter, 268 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936
(1960).
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known to man.' The deprivation of citizenship has drastic
and grave practical consequences.' An expatriate who has
no other nationality becomes a truly stateless person-
a person who not only has no rights as an American citizen,
but no membership in any national entity. Such individuals
enjoy, in general, no protection whatever, and if aggrieved
by a state have no means of redress. The stateless person
may find himself shunted from nation to nation since
there is no state obligated or willing to receive him.8
In this country the expatriate would enjoy, at most, only
the limited rights and privileges of aliens, and like the
alien he might even be subject to deportation.9
The citizenship of one born a citizen of the United
States or naturalized therein 10 may be laid aside," and
any such person may expatriate himself, subject to regulation
by acts of Congress or treaty.' Although the Constitution
is silent with respect thereto, and despite objections that
expatriation statutes are unconstitutional, 3 it is now well
settled that Congress has implied power to provide for
expatriation upon the ground that withdrawal of citizenship
is reasonably related to the power of Congress to regulate
foreign affairs' 4
Expatriation itself has been defined as "the voluntary
renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance." 15
6 Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
7 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958).
8 Kennedy v. Mendoza.-Martinez, supra note 7.
9 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dis-
senting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); United States ex rel.
Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 810
(1963).
10 There are only two sources of American citizenship-birth and
naturalization. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884). For a definition
of naturalization and what constitutes naturalization, see note 187 and
accompanying text infra.
11 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra note 7; United States ex rel.
Scimeca v. Husband, 6 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1925).
12 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). This is declared to be a
natural and inherent right. Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916);
United States ex rel. Anderson v. Howe, 231 Fed. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
See note 23 and accompanying text infra.
13 See MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
14 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 9.
15 Perkins v. Elg, supra note 12, at 334.
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It may result even if the person has not become naturalized
in some other country according to its laws. 6 Furthermore,
loss of citizenship is automatic upon performance of the
expatriating act. One becomes an alien at the time the
act is committed, and not at the time alienage is adminis-
tratively or judicially determined. 7 These concepts have
provided the guidelines for the preparation of this article.
HISTORY OF EXPATRIATION
At common law the general doctrine provided that no
person could, by any act of his own without the consent
of the government, cast off his allegiance and become an
alien.'8 As early as 1795, it was stated that a statute
relative to expatriation was much wanted and that as-
certaining by positive law the manner in which expatriation
may be effected would obviate doubts. 9 Efforts in Congress
in 1808 and 1817 to enact legislation providing for ex-
patriation were unsuccessful and the matter was not
seriously considered until 1865.20 In that year Congress
approved an act providing for loss of rights of citizenship
upon desertion from the armed forces.2 In 1868, as a
result of the refusal of a naturalized citizen's former country
to recognize his right to shed his former allegiance to such
country, Congress formally announced the traditional policy
of this country that expatriation is the natural and inherent
right of all people.2 Impairment of this right, Congress
stated, is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
16Ex Parte Griffin, supra note 12, at 450.
17 Trop v. Dulles, supra note 9, at 106 (Brennan, J., concurring) ; United
States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, supra note 9, at 676.
18 Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830) ; accord, MacKenzie
v. Hare, supra note 13, at 309.
19 Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 154 (1795).
2 0 Naturalization Comm'n 1epot, H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
24 (1905).
2113 Stat. 490-91 (1865).
It should be noted that in the case of Kurtz v. Moffltt, 215 U.S.
487, 501 (1885), it was stated that the provisions of the statute relating
to forfeiture of citizenship could only take effect upon conviction by a court
martial.2 2 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 9, at 48.
194]
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the United States. 3 Although this statute was intended
to apply to the right of immigrants to renounce their former
allegiance, the language is broad enough to cover and does
cover the corresponding right of American citizens to ex-
patriate themselves.24
However, Congress did not in this statute define what
acts constituted expatriation.2 5  Recognizing that the ex-
ecutive branch had no specific legislative authority for
nullifying citizenship, several presidents urged Congress to
define the acts by which citizens should be held to have
expatriated themselves. 6 On the basis of observations and
recommendations made by a commission formed to investigate
the subject of naturalization,27 Congress enacted the Act
of March 2, 1907 [hereinafter referred to as the 1907 Act].
This Act provided for loss of citizenship during peacetime
only (1) by naturalization in a foreign state, (2) by taking
an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, (3) presumptive
loss by naturalized citizens who had resided abroad under
the conditions specified therein, and (4) by American
women when they married foreigners.28
By the early 1930's, the American law on nationality,
including naturalization and denaturalization, was expressed
in a large number of provisions scattered throughout the
statute books. Some of the specific laws enacted at different
times seemed inconsistent with others and Congress also
had left unheeded some problems of growing importance.
In 1933, at the request of the House Committee on Im-
migration and Naturalization, a committee composed of the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Labor was established to review the nationality laws
of the United States, to recommend revisions, and to codify
the nationality laws into one comprehensive statute for
2315 Stat 223-24 (1868).
24 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950); Schneider v. Rusk,
218 F. Supp. 302, 306 (D.D.C.), prob. juris. noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963).
25 Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 136 (1952); Schneider v. Rusk,
mtpra note 24.
26 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 9, at 49.27 Naturalization Comm'n Report, H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 1st
Sess. 23-28 (1905).
2834 Stat. 1228 (1907).
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submission to Congress. After five years of study by
specialists representing the three departments, this com-
mittee formulated a draft code. It noted the special
importance of the provisions concerning the loss of nation-
ality and asserted that they were intended to deprive of
citizenship those persons who had shown that their real
attachment was to the foreign country and not to the
United States. 9
The Nationality Act of 1940 [hereinafter referred to
as the 1940 Act] embodied the draft code and listed ten
acts by which nationals, whether native-born or naturalized, 0
divested themselves of their nationality. It carefully reduced
to specific statutory form a description of the various acts
which of themselves amounted to a voluntary expatriation.31
These provisions were a restatement of those contained
in the 1907 Act and of the historic policy of the United
States to limit duality of citizenship.3
In 1947, the Senate authorized a full and complete
investigation of our entire immigration system since 1911.
Early in the study it was concluded that the immigration
laws were so closely entwined with the naturalization laws
that it was essential for the two sets of laws to be con-
sidered jointly. Therefore, it was decided to draft one com-
plete bill which would embody all such laws.3 Study and
investigation resulted in the Immigration and Naturalization
Act of June 27, 1952 (Ale.Carran-Walter Act) 11 [hereinafter
referred to as the 1952 Act]. This Act continued with
certain modifications, the provisions of the 1940 Act relative
to loss of nationality. 5
29 Hearings on HR. 6127, superseded by HR. 9980, Before the House
Committee on Immigratim and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 406,
512 (1940) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Hearings]. See also Perez v. Brovnell,
supra note 9, at 55-56.
30 54 Stat. 1137, 1168 (1940), as amended, 58 Stat. 677, 746 (1944);
see Gaudio v. Dulles, 110 F. Supp. 706, 708 (D.D.C. 1953). The 1940 Act
became effective on January 13, 1941, 54 Stat. 1174, and repealed the 1907
Act, 54 Stat. 1172.
31 Miranda v. Clark, 180 F.2d 257, 259 (9th Cir. 1950).32 Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 24.
33 S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1950).
3466 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1958).
35 S. REp. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1952). The 1952 Act became effective December
24, 1952, 66 Stat 281 and repealed the 1940 Act, 66 Stat. 280.
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Thus, there have been three expatriation statutes, each
effective on different dates. The Supreme Court, however,
has held that a person's status must be determined in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the laws in effect at the
time the events occurred. 6 Nationality already lost was
not restored by repeal of a statute. 7 For this reason such
repealed statutes must, for practical purposes, be included
in any consideration of the current grounds of expatriation.
RESTRICTIONS UPoN EXPATRIATION
In the statutes providing for expatriation, Congress
has imposed some restrictions so that the performance of
acts which would otherwise cause forfeiture of nationality
did not and does not produce that result where performed
under the conditions specified. In addition, citizenship
may only be lost by voluntary action in conformity with
applicable legal principles. Therefore, it would be well to
consider these limitations before turning to the specific acts
causing expatriation.
At the outset it must be remembered that one who
did not know he was a citizen at the time he performed
an act which is designated as expatriating, does not lose
his citizenship thereby.'
36Mandoli v. Acheson, supra note 25, at 137; see Schaufus v. Attorney
General of the United States, 45 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Md. 1942).
37 Haaland v. Attorney General of the United States, 42 F. Supp. 13,
17 (D. Md. 1941).
38 Rogers v. Patokoski, 271 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1959); Matter of C.,
9 I. & N. Dec. 670, 675-77 (Atty Gen. 1962); Matter of C., 9 I. & N.
Dec. 482 (BIA 1961). "This is a recent development in the expatriation laws.
Prior thereto the contrary view had been taken on the ground that one was
charged with knowledge of the law. See Matter of F., 4 I. & N. Dec. 528
(BIA 1951); Matter of M., 3 I. & N. Dec. 558 (BIA 1949).
"Administrative Decisions Under the Immigration and Nationality Laws"
will be referred to as I. & N. Dec. Except as they may be modified or
overruled by the Board of Immigration Appeals or the Attorney General,
decisions of the Board are binding on all officers or employees of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Selected decisions serve as
precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. 8 C.F.R.
§3.1(g) (1958). Pending publication in bound volumes, these precedents
are issued as numbered interim decisions.
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Acts Performed During Wartime
The 1907 Act contained a provision that expatriation
could not occur while the United States was at war.
39
This prohibition was considered declaratory of the generally
accepted principles of law existing prior to 1907, viz., that
it was the duty of a citizen who was abroad when war
broke out to return without delay; that in time of war the
government should be able to control the services of every
citizen; and that the right of changing allegiance should
not exist when the state is in peril." Its purpose was to
protect the United States during a period of war against
any citizen who might attempt to evade military service by
acquiring the nationality of another country.4
This bar was operative during the period in which the
United States was engaged in World War I. During this
period, naturalization in a foreign state could not cause
expatriation. HEowever, the foreign naturalization was
recognized as expatriative after termination of the war.42
This construction was based upon the beliefs that no sub-
stantial interest of the United States would be served by
refusing to recognize the expatriation, and that it would
be clearly contrary to the interests of this country to permit
one who had in fact abandoned his American citizenship
to enter this country at will with all the rights of a
citizen.43
Oaths of allegiance taken in connection with enlist-
ments in foreign armies during World War I also were
not expatriating under the 1907 Act.4 4  Although a foreign
oath of allegiance taken during this period did not ex-
patriate, if subsequent to that period the person involved
committed an affirmative, overt act which indicated a con-
39 See note 28 stupra.
40H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1906).
41 Petition of Prack, 60 F.2d 171, 172 (W.D. Pa. 1932).
423 HACxWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (1942). World War I corn-
rnenced on April 6, 1917, 40 Stat 1, and ended July 2, 1921, 42 Stat. 105.
46 See also Matter of M.. 4 I. & N. Dec. 398, 399 (Central Office 1951),
wherein the above stated rule was recognized but not applied due to the
peculiar fact situation.
44In re Bishop, 26 F.2d 148, 149 (W.D. Wash. 1927); In re Grant,
289 Fed. 814 (S.D. Cal. 1923).
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tinued allegiance to the foreign state, it was held that the
oath of allegiance taken during wartime was effectively con-
firmed and resulted in loss of nationality."
The prohibition against expatriation during wartime
also prevented an American woman from losing her citizen-
ship by marriage to a foreigner. But, in this case'too,
nationality would be lost under certain conditions upon
termination of the war.
The prohibition against expatriation during wartime
was repealed by the 1940 Act and was not continued
in that Act or the 1952 Act. Although representations
were made to Congress that this ban be retained,46 the
drafters of the code apparently agreed that it should not.47
Since repeal of the 1907 Act, the existence of a state of
war has generally had no effect upon the performance
of an expatriative act.
Acts Performed in the United States
Ordinarily, departure from the country of which a
person had been a national was regarded as an essential
element of expatriation." But, whether this was an es-
sential element under the 1907 Act was not decided by
the Supreme 'Court. 9  The 1940 Act, however, recognizing
the undesirability of American nationals being able to cast
off their American allegiance while continuing to reside
45 Matter of S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 604 (Regional Comm'r 1960).
46 1940 Hearings 289, 388, 398.
47 Id. at 44.
48The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822); Talbot v.
Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). However, since there was no lim-
itation of place therein, this general rule was not applicable to § 3 of the
1907 Act and an American woman lost nationality by marriage to a
foreigner, during the effective period thereof, even though she had remained
in this country. MacKenzie v. Hare, spra note 13.
49Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 24, at 503. In the Savorgnan
case the government contended that an American woman who had obtained
Italian naturalization in 1940 at an Italian consulate in the United States,
had then and there expatriated herself under the 1907 Act. The Court
stated that while residence abroad may have been required before the 1907
Act and was expressly required by the 1940 Act, the 1907 Act did not so
require. However, it was conceded that since at least 1933, the State




in this country,50 made this principle statutory. This Act,
as amended, declared that, except for desertion from the
armed forces of the United States in time of war, treason,
and formal renunciations of allegiance in the United States,
no national could expatriate himself while in the United
States or its outlying possessions. But if any other ex-
patriating acts were performed in this country, or an
outlying possession, expatriation would result upon sub-
sequent residence abroad.51 This restriction was continued
in the current act without change.2 It should be noted
that a mere absence from the United States after per-
formance of an otherwise expatriating act therein without
the establishment of a foreign residence, as defined by
statute, does not result in loss of nationality. "
The 1940 Act defined the term "United States" as
including continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 4  The term "outlying pos-
sessions" included all territory, other than as specified in
the term "United States," over which the United States
exercised rights of sovereignty, with the exception of the
Canal Zone.55 The 1952 Act added Guam in the definition
of the United States and named American Samoa and Swains
Island as outlying possessions. 7
50 1940 Hearings 492.
5154 Stat. 1169 (1940), as amended, 58 Stat. 677 (1944). See Savorgnan
v. United States, supra note 24, at 493 n.2.
5266 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a) (1958): "Except as provided
in paragraphs (7), (8). and (9) of section 349 of this title, no national
of the United States can expatriate himself, or be expatriated, under this
Act while within the United States or any of its outlying possessions, but
expatriation shall result from the performance within the United States or
any of its outlying possessions of any of the acts or the fulfillment of any
of the conditions specified in this chapter if and when the national thereafter
takes up residence outside the United States and its outlying possessions."
53 Matter of W., I I. & N. Dec. 558, 560 (BIA 1943). In this case
one took an oath of allegiance to the King of England in 1943 in connection
with his induction into the Canadian Armed Forces at Boston, Massachusetts.
Thereafter, he was absent from April 12, 1943, to May 10, 1943, in Canada
as a member of the armed forces. This was held not to constitute taking
up residence abroad. However, since he also possessed Canadian nationality
and was serving in the Canadian Armed Forces while in Canada, he was
held expatriated as the result of such service.
54 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
5 5 Ibid.
56 66 Stat. 171 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a) (38) (1958).
57 66 Stat. 170 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (29) (1958).
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The term "residence" was also defined in the 1940 Act
as "the place of general abode." 58 The definition was in-
tended to cover the principal dwelling place of a person,
omitting the element of intent. 9 This definition cleared
up uncertainties as to the type and amount of residence
abroad required to establish expatriation. The term "res-
idence" was used in the 1940 Act as plainly as possible
to denote an objective fact. Although definitions of residence
frequently include the element of intent as to the future
place of abode, no mention of intent was made in the
1940 Act, and the actual "place of general abode" was the
sole test for determining residence.6"
The 1952 Act was more explicit in that the statute
itself specified that the place of general abode meant a
person's principal or actual dwelling place in fact, without
regard to one's intent." The courts have generally followed
these definitions and, consequently, have ruled out the
factor of intent in determining residence under the ex-
patriation statutes.62 However, disregarding intent does
not mean that a person's permanent place of abode must
always be determined by his external conduct, regardless
of the purposes of his stay, and it has been held that
when a person has established that he lives in more than
58 54 Stat. 1138 (1940). Although this definition is not expressly ap-
plicable to §401, 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), which relates to loss of nationality,
the Court in the Savorgnan case nevertheless utilized it. Savorgnan v.
United States, supra note 24.
59 1940 Hearings 417.
60 Savorgnan v. United States, upra note 24, at 505-06. The Court found
that the principal dwelling place of a woman who lived abroad with her
husband and his family was, in fact, with her husband, despite her con-
tentions that she did not intend to establish a permanent residence abroad,
or abandon her residence in the United States. See also Matter of A.,
7 I. & N. Dec. 619 (BIA 1957), in which it was concluded that one
was "residing" abroad with her daughter, despite the fact that she main-
tained a room in the United States in which personal possessions were
stored, where the evidence indicated that such room had not been used
as an apartment for some time before the citizen had gone to the foreign
country to live with her daughter.
6166 Stat. 170 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(33) (1958). This definition
was intended to give effect to the Supreme Court's interpretation in the
Savoranan case. H.R. REP. No. 1364. 82d Conz., 2d Sess. 33 (1952).
62 Garlasco v. Dulles, 243 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1957); Guerrieri v.
Herter, 186 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.D.C. 1960) ; Strupp v. Herter, 180 F. Supp.
440, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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one country, the fact that he considers one place his
permanent home in preference to the other place is of
importance.6
Age at Which Ewpatriating Acts May be Performed
Prior to January 1941, the statutes did not specify at
what age an expatriative act could effectively be performed.
Since voluntariness is an essential ingredient of an ex-
patriating act and since the act of a minor was not regarded
as voluntary in that sense,64 it was repeatedly held under
the 1907 Act that one could not lose American citizenship
during minority.6" Thus, citizens who had not attained the
age of twenty-one years were not expatriated prior to 1941
by taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country,16
by becoming naturalized therein in their own right" 7
or under the provisions of a treaty." It is to be noted,
however, that where one performed an expatriating act
while a minor he could by clear and unequivocal acts after
reaching his majority indicate a desire to confirm the acts
taken during minority, and thereby complete his loss of
nationality under that Act.69
This age limitation as to the performance of expatriative
acts was generally reduced to eighteen years by the 1940
Act,70 in the belief that a person who had reached that
age should be able to appreciate fully the seriousness of
63 United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953); Matter of
C., 7 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA 1957).
64 Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1953); Haaland v.
Attorney General of the United States, sepra note 37, at 20.65 Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Mazza v.
Acheson, 104 F. Supp. 157, 158 (N.D. Cal. 1952).66 Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166, 174 (D.D.C. 1951); United
States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F.2d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
67 Matter of G., 1 I. & N. Dec. 329 (1942). Contra, It re Wittus,
47 F2d 652 (E.D. Mich. 1931), where it was held that a woman nineteen
years of age lost her citizenship by marrying an alien prior to September
22, 1922.
68 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 338 (1939).69 Mazza v. Acheson, supra note 65; Di Girolamo v. Acheson, 101 F.
Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1951) (dictum).
7054 Stat. 1170 (1940).
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such an act.71 Hence, voting in a foreign election 72 or employ-
ment by a foreign government 73 at age twenty amounted
to expatriation under the 1940 Act, whereas these same acts
performed by one under eighteen years of age did not.
However, even under the 1940 Act there were certain
expatriative acts which were not effective unless a person
had attained the age of twenty-one years, viz., formal re-
nunciation of his allegiance to the United States, 74 his own
application for naturalization in a foreign state 71 or loss
of citizenship by residence abroad.76 The eighteen-year
age limitation was apparently continued in the current Act
with the modification that certain expatriative acts com-
mitted while under eighteen years of age could be dis-
affirmed within six months after attaining that age.
77
Expatriation Must be by l7 oluntary Action
Since the essence of expatriation is that it be voluntary,78
the right of citizenship can only be waived as the result of
free and intelligent choice.79 Duress which inhibits such
71 1940 Hearings 492, 493. See also Miranda v. Clark, 180 F.2d 257
(9th Cir. 1950).
72 Miranda v. Clark, supra note 71. In that case the constitutionality
of this provision of the statute was sustained.73 Matter of G., 4 I. & N. Dec. 521 (BIA 1951).
74McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951).
75 Matter of R., 3 1. & N. Dec. 470 (Central Office 1949). In view
of the exclusion of this ground from the 1940 Act, the common-law rule
was applied.
76 Ibid.
7766 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1483(b) (1958): "A national who
within six months after attaining the age of eighteen years asserts his claim
to United States nationality, in such manner as the Secretary of State shall
by regulation prescribe, shall not be deemed to have expatriated himself
by the commission, prior to his eighteenth birthday, of any of the acts
specified .. "
Although this statute is not as affirmative as §403(b) of the 1940
Act, the legislative intent is clear. It was intended to continue in effect
the provisions of the 1940 Act, but to modify the conditions under which
a person who commits certain expatriating acts while under eighteen years
of age may repudiate those acts and thus preserve his United States citizen-
ship. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1952). For the State
Department regulations as to the procedure for assertion of the claim to
citizenship, see 22 C.F.R. §§ 50.9-.10 (1958).
78 Doreau v. Marshall, 170 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1948); Inouye v. Clark,
73 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Cal. 1947), rev'd on other groinds, 175 F.2d 740
(9th Cir. 1949).
79Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958); Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952).
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a choice is, therefore, a defense to expatriation."0 Threats
of loss of civil rights,8' jail,8 2 concentration camp,"3  or fear
of reprisals or physical injury 84 to oneself or one's family 5
have all been held to avoid loss of nationality. The means
of exercising duress is not limited to weapons, or physical
threats,86 and economic duress has been similarly regarded."
Where military service in a foreign country is com-
pulsory, the taking of the oath of allegiance in connection
therewith is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
presumed to be involuntary.88 Failure to protest or to ask
for American consular protection upon entry into the foreign
army are irrelevant to the issue of voluntariness.89 Also
irrelevant is the fact that one should have known that when
he voluntarily entered the foreign state he would be drafted
at some future date.90
Mere statements, however, indicating duress do not
avoid expatriation where the evidence is overwhelming that
80 Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79.
81 Soccodato v. Dulles, supra note 65.82 Kamada v. bulles, 145 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
83 Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicholls, 161 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1947).84 Kamada v. Dulles, supra note 82; Scardino v. Acheson, 113 F. Supp.
754 (D.N.J. 1953).
85 Schioler v. Secretary of State, 175 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1949); Doreau
v. Marshall, supra note 78. An unfounded, but genuine fear of harm or
reprisal will avoid loss of nationality. Matter of G., 8 I. & N. Dec. 317,
322 (BIA 1959).88 Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
87 Stipa v. Dulles, 233 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1956).
The following were considered duress: (1) where one took what
might have been a government position in order to subsist, Insogna v.
Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1953); (2) where one voted after being
informed that unless she did so, her food rations would be discontinued,
Takehara v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1953); (3) marital coercion
where one remained abroad due to the severe illness of his wife, Mendelsohn
v. Dulles, 207 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1953); (4) where there was coercion
by one's husband, Inouye v. Clark, agpra note 78; (5) where there was
parental coercion, Takehara v. Dulles. supra; (6) where there was fear
of loss of access to one's country, Nakashima v. Acheson, supra note 86;
and (7) where there was formal renunciation of American citizenship
and conditions at a relocation center, where Americans, born of Japanese
descent, were detained, created an atmosphere of mental fear and intimidation,
Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).88 Moldoveanu v. Dulles, 168 F. Supp. 1 (FD. Mich. 1958). Compare
Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79.89 Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1953). See Nishikawa v.
Dulles, supra note 79.
90 Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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such military service was voluntarily performed." Military
service may be performed willingly, freely and even vol-
untarily, although technically there is no enlistment but
conscription under a compulsory service law.2 The in-
ference of duress which flows from conscription is subject
to rebuttal through evidence that foreign law permitted
invocation of American citizenship as a ground for immunity
from service and that such immunity was not invoked, or
through evidence that the American volunteered for service
more onerous than that mandatorily imposed upon a con-
script. 3 Thus, despite claims of involuntary action, one
who had participated in public demonstrations honoring
Adolph Hitler and had acted as a spy for the German
Army,94 one who had accepted a commission as a first lieu-
tenant in a foreign army and took an oath of allegiance
at that time,95 or one who had personally seen the American
consul on frequent occasions but had not at any time
requested personal assistance or asylum 96 were all deemed
to have served voluntarily in foreign armed forces and to
have lost American nationality.
Erroneous advice by American government officials may
also have a bearing upon the existence or nonexistence of
a free choice.97 Where performance of expatriating acts
was required as the result of such advice,98 or entry as an
alien was sought after such erroneous advice had been
given,9  American citizenship was held retained.100  In
91 United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 375 U.S. 810 (1963).
92 Acheson v. Maenza, supra note 90, at 458.
9 3 Augello v. Dulles, 220 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1955) (dictum).
94 Bauer v. Clark, 161 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 839
(1947).
95 Frederici v. Miller, 99 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
96 United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, supra note 91. See also
Vaccaro v. Bernsen, 267 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1959), in which it was found
that voting was voluntary despite claims of coercion. See also Kiyama v.
Rusk, 291 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1961).9 7 Acheson v. Maenza, supra note 90; Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 306
(2d Cir. 1950).9 8Podea v. Acheson, supra note 97; see also Matter of S., 8 I. & N.
Dec. 226 (BIA.1958).
99 Paracchini v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
100 However, voting in political elections in Japan and Germany subsequent
to World War II at the urging of the occupying American forces did not,
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accordance with applicable legal principles, it has been held
that mental incompetency prevents voluntariness of action. 101
Intoxication" 2  and entrapment 10 3  appear to be similarly
regarded.
In short, each case must be judged by its own facts
and circumstances. There must be consideration of the
circumstances attending the expatriative act and the reason-
able inferences to be drawn therefrom,0 4 and the trier of
the facts must consider all evidence relating to the mental
condition of the actor to determine whether his act was
the result of another's influence. 0 5
However, voluntariness of action is not to be confused
with intent to renounce citizenship. An intent to renounce
American citizenship is not a prerequisite for expatriation.""
Even though one does not intend to give up American
citizenship or is in ignorance of the fact that an act would
deprive him of citizenship, 107 if the specified acts are vol-
untarily performed, 10 American nationality is lost.
Burden of Proving Ewpatriation
When the Supreme Court declared that rights of citizen-
ship were not to be destroyed by an ambiguity, it was
referring to a treaty.10 9  Because the consequences of
of itself, constitute duress. Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 833 (1952); Acheson v. Kuniyuki, 189 F.2d 741 (9th
Cir. 1951), rehearing denied, 190 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
942 (1952).
1OMcCampbell v. McCampbell, 13 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
See also McGrath v. Abo, supra note 74, at 772, where the government
admitted "that eight plaintiffs lacked sufficient mental capacity to accomplish
legally binding acts and made no defense to their cases on the merits."
102 See Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 1916), where the court
held that it had not been shown that the petitioner was so under the in-
fluence of liquor when he performed the expatriating acts that he did not
understand the nature of his acts.
103 See Acheson v. Wohlmuth, supra note 100.
10 4 Acheson v. Murata, 342 U.S. 900 (1952) (per curiam); Acheson v.
Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952) (per curiam).
105 Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38, 43 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
IO6 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1950); Acheson
v. Revedin, 194 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952);
Scavone v. Acheson, 103 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
107 Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 106; Scavone v. Acheson,
supra note 106, at 61.
'
0 SAcheson v. Wohlmuth, supra note 100.
109 Perkins v. Elg, supra note 68.
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denationalization are so drastic, this principle has been
applied to evidentiary ambiguities,"' and, prior to September
1961, once citizenship was established the burden was upon
the government to prove the performance of an expatriative
act by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence."' If
the issue of voluntariness were injected, the same degree
of proof was required to establish that the act had been
voluntarily performed." 2  This burden of proof was so
heavy that it had been held that previous extrajudicial
admissions of voting in a foreign election, later repudiated,
were insufficient to establish expatriation in the absence of
satisfactory corroboration." 3 Even uncorroborated testimony
of duress sustained a finding that expatriating acts were
involuntary," 4 and disbelief of one's motives and fears did
not fill the evidentiary gap." 5  Not only were factual doubts
to be resolved in favor of citizenship," 6 but the facts and
the law were to be construed as far as reasonably possible
in favor of the citizen." 7
110 Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79, at 133.
"' See note 119 and accompanying text infra. See Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44 (1958). This rule applied to all subsections of the 1940 Act,
Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79, at 133, and to the 1907 Act, Matter
of P., 9 I. & N. Dec. 369 (BIA 1961). It should be noted that the pattern
of expatriation cases is that a claim generally is made that American
citizenship has been retained and it is contested by the government.
112 Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79. Previously, the burden had been
upon the citizenship claimant to prove that his action was not voluntary.
See McGrath v. Abo, supra note 74, at 773-74. In Nishikawa the Court
held that common experience dictates that one ordinarily acts voluntarily.
Unless voluntariness is put in issue the government makes its case simply
by proving the objective expatriating act.
113 Gonzalez-Jasso v. Rogers, 264 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See also
Martinez v. McGrath, 108 F. Supp. 155, 156 (S.D. Tex. 1952); Nieto v.
McGrath, 108 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Tex. 1951).
114 Pandolfo v. Acheson, 202 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1953).
115 Nishikawa v. Dulles, sutSra note 79, .at 137. Although the burden
was upon the defendant to show that citizenship was lost, where the
plaintiff assumed tie burden, i.e., before the defendant offered any proof,
the plaintiff took the witness stand and testified, and the record clearly
and ,unmistakably showed that the plaintiff by his acts and conduct had
forfeited citizenship, a decree of loss of nationality was affirmed despite
an assumption that the case was tried upon an erroneous burden of proof.
Bauer v. Clark, supra note 94, at 401.
11 Stipa v. Dulles, mipra note 87; Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Alata v. Dulles, 221 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
117 Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79. Despite the modification of the
burden of proof, this principle remains effective. Matter of C., 9 I. & N.
Dec. 670 (Att'y Gen. 1962).
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Following the decision of the Supreme Court requiring
that expatriation be proved by clear, convincing and un-
equivocal evidence, 118 Congress statutorily revised the burden
of proof by providing that when loss of United States
nationality is put in issue, such loss may be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and placing the burden
of proving that expatriative acts were involuntary upon
the person who committed them." 9  By its own terms, this
statute is limited to proceedings commenced on or after its
enactment on September 26, 1961,120 and it has no ap-
plication to a proceeding which was instituted prior to that
date. 21
Presumptions
In addition to the causes whereby American nationality
could be lost, the 1940 Act created a presumption of
expatriation by service in a foreign military force or through
acceptance or performance of the duties of a post under
a foreign state, where a citizen other than an officer or
employee of the United States or a member of his family
had resided for six months or longer in certain foreign
states.'22 This presumption was rebutted by the presenta-
11 Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79, at 133.
I1975 Stat. 656 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 14 81(c) (Supp. IV, 1962): "When-
ever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any action or
proceeding commenced on or after the enactment of this subsection under,
or by virtue of, the provisions of this or any other Act, the burden shall
be upon the person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish
such claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (b), any person who commits or performs, or who
has committed or performed, any act of expatriation under the provisions
of this or any other Act shall be presumed to have done so voluntarily,
but such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence that the act or acts committed or performed were not done
voluntarily."
120 Matter of P., 9 I. & N. Dec. 578, 580 (BIA 1962).
121Matter of Picone, Interim Decision No. 1259 n.6 (Att'y Gen. 1963).
12254 Stat. 1169 (1940): "A national of the United States who was
born in the United States, or who was born in any place outside of thejurisdiction of the United States of a parent who was born in the United
States, shall be presumed to have expatriated himself under subsections(c) or (d) of Section 401, when he shall remain for si:x months or longer
within any foreign state of which he or either of his parents shall have
been a national according to the laws of such foreign state, or within any
place under control of such foreign state, and such presumption shall exist
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tion of satisfactory evidence to a United States diplomatic,
consular, or immigration officer. This provision was not
retroactive and it could not be applied against anyone before
January 13, 1941, nor could the six months' residence have
begun prior to that date. 2 ' However, this presumption
did not destroy the basic requirement of voluntariness, 24
and was easily rebutted. 2 ' Evidence of conscription dis-
pelled the presumption, 2 6 and once it was shown thAt
the citizen did no act which brought him under these
sections the force of this statute was spent.'27
The current Act introduced a new concept in the field
of expatriation law by providing for a conclusive pre-
sumption that expatriating acts were voluntarily done if
the person was a dual national who had been physically
present in the foreign state for more than ten years prior
thereto. 2  However, this conclusive presumption is ad-
dressed only to the issue of voluntariness. It has no
application in cases in which the acts were performed
voluntarily but without knowledge that one was a citizen, 29
or where the citizen relied upon the advice of a U. S.
until overcome whether or not the individual has returned to the United
States. Such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of
satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States,
or to an immigration officer of the United States, under such rules
and regulations as the Department of State and the Department of Justicejointly prescribe. However, no such presumption shall arise with respect
to any officer or employee of the United States while serving abroad as
such officer or employee nor to any accompanying member of his
family."
It should be noted that this section was adopted upon the special recom-
mendation of the Wrar Department with a view to checking the activities of
persons regarded as prospective fifth columnists. See Kawakita v. United
States, 343 U.S. 717, 730 n.5 (1952).
123 S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 752, 753 (1950).
124 Acheson v. Maenza, supra note 90, at 457.
125 Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra note 79.
126 Ibid.
127 Kawakita v. United States, supra note 122; Dos Reis ex rel. Camara
v. Nicolls, supra note 83.
12866 Stat 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1481(b) (1958): "Any person who
commits or performs any act specified in subsection (a) shall be conclusively
presumed to have done so voluntarily and without having been subjected to
duress of any kind, if such person at the time of the act was a national
of the state in. which the act was performed and had been physically
present at such state for a period or periods totaling ten years or more
immediately prior to such act."
129 Matter of C., supra note 117.
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government official and would not have jeopardized his
citizenship had he not been informed that it was already
lost to him. 30 Also, if the physical presence in the foreign
state was involuntary, i.e., where continued efforts to depart
were unavailing and the prolonged physical presence in the
foreign state resulted from official prevention of departure, 3'
duress would be available as a defense.
132
GROUNDS OF EXPATRIATION
Under the Provisio'ns of Treaties
Beginning with the so-called "Bancroft conventions"
concluded with certain of the German states in 1868, the
United States has from time to time entered into agree-
ments relating to naturalization with various other states.
These agreements have been designed principally to remove
conflicting claims to the allegiance of naturalized persons,
and to prevent the imposition of obligations of military
service and other obligations of nationality by one party
to the agreement on persons having dual nationality who
are more closely connected with the other party.33 These
instruments typically provide that each of the signatory
nations would regard as a citizen of the other such of its
citizens as became naturalized by the other. Most of them
contain further provisions under which a naturalized citizen
130 Matter of S., supra note 98.
-13 Matter of S., 9 I. & N. Dec. 711 (Central Office 1962).
132 Ibid. This conclusive presumption has been noted by the Supreme
Court, but its validity was not considered because it was not an issue in the
case. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
13 3 HAKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 377 (1942). These treaties fall
into six categories: (1) early conventions with European states, patterned
largely upon, and including the German conventions: Austria-Hungary,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany (North German Confederation, Baden, Bavaria,
Hesse, Wurttenberg), Great Britain, Portugal, Sweden and Norway; (2)
agreements with Latin American states; Brazil, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay; (3) the peace treaties of the
World War of 1914-18: Austria, Germany and Hungary; (4) post-war
naturalization treaties: Albania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia; (5) dual
nationality and military service agreements: Finland, Lithuania, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland; (6) multi-partite agreements: Pan American con-
ventions on the status of naturalized citizens and on nationality of women,
and the protocol relating to military obligations in certain cases of dual
nationality. Ibid. See also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
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of the United States may be held to have renounced such
naturalization if he established a permanent residence in
the foreign state from which he came, with an intent not
to return to this country. The foreign residence may be
presumed to be permanent when the citizen shall have
resided for two years in such foreign state." 4
This series of treaties initiated this country's policy
of automatic divestment of citizenship for specified con-
duct affecting our foreign relations. Upon the basis of
the Act of 1868 and such treaties as were in force, it
became the practice of the Department of State during
the last third of the nineteenth century to make rulings
as to forfeiture of American citizenship by individuals who
performed various acts abroad. 3 5
American nationality could be lost under such a treaty
where one returned to his former country intending to
remain there permanently, or where one was employed
there for many years by one company and made no man-
ifestation of an intention to return to this country.'3 6
However, if the residence abroad was of a temporary nature
and the intent to return to this country always existed,
the presumption would be rebutted, " ' and citizenship re-
tained. Further, the residence abroad must be voluntary.3
The applicability of treaties was continued by express statu-
tory declaration in the 1940 M and 1952 1 Acts.
'34 1940 Hearings 505, 506.
'35 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 49 (1958).
136 Matter of L., 3 I. & N. Dec. 98 (Central Office 1947).
'37 Matter of 0., 4 I. & N. Dec. 321, 323 (Central Office 1951); see
Matter of E., 3 I. & N. Dec. 668 (Central Office 1949).
138 Perkins v. Eig, supra note 133.
13954 Stat. 1171 (1940): "Nothing in this Act shall be applied in con-
travention of the provisions of any treaty or convention to which the United
States is a party upon the date of the approval of the Act"
14066 Stat. 272 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1489 (1958): "Nothing in this title
shall be applied in contravention of the provisions of any treaty or convention
to which the United States is a party and which has been ratified by the
Senate upon .he effective date of this title: Provided, however, That no
woman who was a national of the United States shall be deemed to have
lost her nationality solely by reason of her marriage to an alien on or after
September 22, 1922, or to an alien racially ineligible to citizenship on or
after March 3, 1931, or, in the case of a woman who was a United States
citizen at birth, through residence abroad following such marriage, not-




A person who is claimed as a citizen or subject of two
states is said to possess dual nationality.'4 ' This concept,
well recognized in international law, recognizes that a person
may have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries
and be subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact
that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not, with-
out more, mean that he is renouncing the other. However,
dual nationality cannot exist if the assertion of rights
or the assumption of liabilities of one are inconsistent
with the maintenance of the other.142  The United States
has long recognized the general undesirability of dual
nationality,'43 and it has been an issue of concern to
Congress for many years. It was, and still is, the intention
that dual nationality be eliminated to every degree possible. 44
Under the 1907 Act, it had been held that a citizen of
the United States who acquired a foreign nationality during
minority, either in his own right or derivatively, must elect
to retain American citizenship after reaching majority in
order to retain such citizenship. 14  An election did not
require a formal prescribed procedure, but was possible
of determination from the circumstances of a person's con-
duct and behavior. Return to the United States upon
attaining majority constituted an election to retain American
nationality.'" Elections to retain American nationality were
also deemed made upon reaching majority: where one
141 Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D.D.C. 1951): "By
reason of differences between nationality laws of various countries, there
are many persons whose allegiance is claimed by two or more states, or
conversely, upon whom the benefits of nationality are conferred by two or
more countries. These conflicts arise principally by reason of the fact
that in some countries nationality is governed by fis soli, i.e., it originates
by birth within the country; in others, it is based on jus sanguinis, i.e.,
the child inherits the nationality of its parents irrespective of his place
of birth; and in still others, like the United States, it may be predicated
on either jus soli or Jus sanguinis."
142 Kawakita v. United States, supra note 122, at 724.
143 Savorgnan v. United States, supra note 106.
144 Gaudio v. Dulles, 110 F. Supp. 706 (D.D.C. 1953).
145 Matter of G., 1 I. & N. Dec. 329 (BIA 1942). See also Segreti v.
Acheson, 195 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1952). This right of election was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Perkins v. Elg, supra note 133.
146 Perkins v. Elg, supra note 133.
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registered with an American Consul and entered the United
States for permanent residence when twenty-three years of
age, although he remained for only two months and had
entered as a United States citizen on an average of five
times a year for twenty years; 147 where one had claimed
American nationality upon entry for a temporary period
during minority by presentation of his birth certificate, and
after majority maintained a course of conduct consistent
only with that of American citizenship; 148 where a dual
national attempted to return to the United States at the
age of nineteen, but was thwarted by governmental action; 149
and where one was consistently admitted to the United
States for visits upon a claim of American citizenship. 50
Conversely, elections to give up American nationality, which
required a voluntary act connoting more than mere resi-
dence abroad,' were established by voting in a foreign
election, 1 52 use of a passport of the foreign state, 5 3 and
failure to disaffirm acquisition of a homestead in Canada
upon attaining majority. 154  However, registering in a
foreign draft as a foreign national and an unsuccessful
effort to enlist in the foreign army during World War II,
or an attempted enlistment in a foreign militia during
minority, were held not to indicate an abandonment of
American citizenship and not to constitute an election
of the foreign nationality. 55
It is to be noted that the doctrine of election had no
application to a person who was vested with dual nationality
' 4 Matter of G., 1 I. & N. Dec. 496 (BIA 1943).
14S Matter of Y., 2 I. & N. Dec. 124 (BIA 1944).
149 Matter of F., 1 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1943).
150 Matter of F., 2 I. & N. Dec. 427, 428 (BIA 1946). It is interesting
to note that once an election to retain citizenship of the United States had
been made, one's status was determined, and he could only divest himself
thereof by performing acts that would under existing law, result in ex-
patriation. Matter of M., 1 I. & N. Dec. 536, 538 (BIA 1943).
151 Matter of S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 476, 480-81 (Atty Gen. 1943).
152 Matter of W., 1 I. & N. Dec. 24 (BIA 1941).
'53 Matter of L., 3 I. & N. Dec. 98, 101 (Central Office 1947).
154 Matter of G., supra note 145.
155 Matter of E., 1 I. & N. Dec. 548 (BIA 1943).
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at birth, 15 and such a dual national was not required
to make an election to retain American citizenship. 157
Solution of the dual nationality problem was attempted
by the 1940 Act which contained an implicit congressional
design to discourage dual nationality. 5 8  It was designed
to clarify the law by specifying a definite method of termin-
ating dual citizenship and electing American nationality.5 9
The purpose of its provisions was to relieve the United
States from the embarrassment ensuing when American
citizens exposed themselves to conflicting demands for al-
legiance, and to force such dual nationals to elect whether
to return to the United States or to forfeit their American
citizenship. 6
Section 401(a) of that Act recognized the theory of
election and definitely limited the manner of evidencing
election to a taking up of residence in this country within
the time limit specified.''
Still faced with the problem of dual nationals during
its consideration of the 1952 Act, and desiring to terminate
such status,1 2 Congress enacted a new section divesting
dual nationals at birth of American citizenship where they
had voluntarily sought or claimed benefits of a foreign
nationality and had resided in the country of that nationality
for three years after age twenty-two.'63
156 In the Matter of Bernasconi, 113 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1953);
Matter of R., 1 I. & N. Dec. 389 (BIA 1943). See Mandoli v. Acheson,
344 U.S. 133, 137 (1952).
157 Matter of H., 2 I. & N. Dec. 313, 314 (BIA 1945). The general
doctrine of election by dual nationals expired on the effective date.
15 8 Hamamoto v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
159 Miranda v. Clark, 180 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1950).
160 In the Matter of Bernasconi, supra note 156.
161 Matter of G., supra note 147.
162 See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 768-69, 809 (1952); H.RL
REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1952).
163 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1958): "A person who acquired
at birth the nationality of the United States and of a foreign state and
who has voluntarily sought or claimed benefits of the nationality of any
foreign state shall lose his United States nationality by hereafter having
a continuous residence for three years in the foreign state of which he is
a national by birth at any time after attaining the age of twenty-two years
unless he shall-
(1) prior to the expiration of such three-year period, take an oath of
allegiance to the United States before a United States diplomatic or
consular officer in a manner prescribed by the Secretary of State; and
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This section affects all persons who are dual nationals
at birth, whether born in or out of the United States. 64
The three years' residence must follow the seeking or
claiming of the benefits. 65 This statute is prospective,'66
and nationality is not lost unless the individual has sought
or claimed the benefits of foreign nationality after December
24, 1952 and thereafter, and after his twenty-second birth-
day, acquires a period of three years residence in the
foreign state of his nationality. Although reliance may
not be had upon acts performed prior to December 24, 1952,
where the benefits of the foreign nationality were sought
or claimed before December 24, 1952 but the continued
exercise of the claim or enjoyment of the benefits continued
thereafter, one comes within the statute and loss of citizen-
ship will result when coupled with a three years' residence
after that date. 67
The benefit voluntarily sought or claimed by the dual
national must be substantial and indicative of an intention
to express some elements of preference to another country
in a measure inconsistent with American citizenship. Hence
a dual national who claimed to be a Mexican citizen in order
to gain admission to the United States as an agricultural
worker, did not seek or claim a benefit within the con-
templation of the 1952 Act. 6 ' However, applying for a
foreign passport or identity card and presenting it at the
time of admission to the United States constitutes seeking
(2) have his residence outside of the United States solely for one
of the reasons in paragraph (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) of section
353; or paragraph (1) or (2) of section 354 of this title: Provided however,
That nothing contained in this section shall deprive any person of his United
States nationality if his foreign residence shall begin after he shall have
attained the age of sixty years and shall have had his residence in the
United States for twenty-five years after having attained the age of eighteen
years."
164 Matter of H., 9 I. & N. Dec. 411 (BIA 1961) ; Matter of G., 7 I. & N.
Dec. 195 (BIA 1956).
165 Matter of J., 8 I. & N. Dec. 112 (BIA 1958).
166 Ibid.
167 Matter of S., 9 I. & N. Dec. 664 (BIA 1962); Matter of V., 7 I. & N.
Dec. 218 (BIA 1956).
168 Matter of R., 7 I. & N. Dec. 718 (BIA 1958).
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or claiming the benefits of a foreign nationality, 169 as does
holding land in Mexico, which aliens were not permitted
to acquire without special permission.'7
Loss by Marriage
Prior to 1907, the marriage of a woman citizen to a
foreigner did not change her allegiance so long as she
remained in this country.17 ' To cause loss of citizenship
it was necessary for her to leave the United States or take
some equally patent step to show an election to relinquish
citizenship.' 72 Such an election was established where a
woman citizen married a national of a country with which
this country had a naturalization treaty, thereby acquiring
his nationality, and emigrated to that country.1 3
Between 1907 and 1922, an American woman who
married a foreigner lost her citizenship thereby. This pro-
vision of the 1907 Act was based upon the principle of
identity of husband and wife. 74  Under this Act marriage
to an alien was expatriative whether or not the woman
acquired a foreign nationality thereby ' and even though
she resided in the United States. 7 6  However, it was admin-
169 See Matter of J., supra note 165, at 115-16. In Jalbuena v. Dulles,
254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958), the court held that a dual national of this
country and the Philippine Islands who took an oath of allegiance to obtain
a Philippine passport was not expatriated under the 1940 Act upon the
ground that his conduct was merely declaratory of what he was as a dual
national entitled to travel documents from each country. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service is not in accord with this view. Matter of S.,
8 I. & N. Dec. 604, 605-06 (Regional Comm'r 1960).
170 Matter of V., supra note 167.
171 See Shanks v. Dupont, 8 U.S. (3 Pet.) 395 (1830). This was the
decided weight of authority. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
For the view that citizenship was lost even though the woman had never
been domiciled outside the United States, see In re Krausman, 28 F.2d 1004
(E.D. Mich. 1928); In re Page, 12 F.2d 135 (S.D. Cal. 1926).
172 I re Wright, 19 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1937) ; see Perez v. Brovnell,
s~pra note 135, at 64-65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
173 Matter of H., supra note 157. In such cases she was considered to
have been naturalized in that country and to have lost American nationality
thereby. See Matter of G., 4 I. & N. Dec. 93 (Central Office 1950),
where there was no naturalization treaty and she was not held expatriated.
174 MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). If the marriage was void
at its inception, or perhaps was voidable and was thereafter annulled, nation-
ality was not lost. Inaba v. Nagle, 36 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1929).
175 Matter of K., 4 I. & N. Dec. 154 (Central Office 1950).
176 MacKenzie v. Hare, supra note 174.
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istratively held that the statute was inoperative if the hus-
band were an American citizen at the time of the marriage.
The fact that he might have become an alien during coverture
did not affect her citizenship.1 7
The statutory bar to expatriation during wartime
applied to a woman who married an alien and, therefore,
such marriage during World War I would not result in
expatriation. 7 s In such instances where the marital status
was not previously terminated, -citizenship was deemed lost
on July 2, 1921, when the war was declared at an end.179
However, if the husband was naturalized during the war
period, so that at its end he was no longer an alien, citizen-
ship was retained.' 0
This provision was substantially repealed by the Act
of September 22, 1922,111 but such repeal did not restore
citizenship lost thereunder. Mere marriage after that date
did not cause loss of citizenship, 8 2 unless a woman married
an alien ineligible for citizenship.' The last remnants
of the effect of marriage on loss of citizenship were eliminated
on March 3, 1931,184 and since that date marriage alone has
not caused expatriation.'
By Naturalization in a Foreign State
From the beginning, one of the most obvious and
effective forms of expatriation has been that of naturalization
under the laws of another nation, which automatically
'77 Matter of K., smpra note 175.
178 See In re Varat, 1 F. Supp. 898 (E.D.N.Y. 1932).
179 In the Matter of Peterson, 33 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Wash. 1940); 3
HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 133, at 267 (1942).
180 Matter of M., 4 I. & N. Dec. 398 (Central Office 1951).
18142 Stat. 1021 (1922).
182 Matter of W., 3 I. & N. Dec. 107, 109 (BIA 1948). It would be
lost if, in connection with marriage, she performed an affirmative act required
by the law of her husband's state as a prerequisite to the acquisition of his
nationality. 3 HAcKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 133, at 258 (1942).183Ex parte Hing, 22 F.2d 554 (W.D. Wash. 1927).
18446 Stat. 1511 (1931): "A woman citizen of the United States shall
not cease to be a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage
after this section,- as amended, takes effect, unless she makes a formal re-
nunciation of her citizenship before a court having jurisdiction over naturaliza-
tion of aliens."




results in loss of American citizenship.' Prior to the
1940 Act, naturalization had been defined as "the raising
of an alien to the rank of citizen and the clothing of this
alien with the privileges of citizenship."'8 7 That Act defined
it as the "conferring of nationality of a state upon a
person after birth," 's and the current statute added "by
any means whatsoever." '1 9 Thus, naturalization is not
limited to the conferring of nationality upon a person as
a result of his own application but includes the derivative
naturalization of minors through the naturalization of their
parents, acquisition of nationality through marriage, and
collective acquisition of the nationality of a state by in-
habitants of territory annexed by that state.10 It does not
include a person who acquired American citizenship at birth
abroad by virtue of the citizenship and prior residence of
a parent.' 91
The language "has been naturalized in any foreign state"
refers to the naturalization into the citizenship of any
foreign state and not to the place where the naturalization
proceeding occurs. Thus, a person may be naturalized in a
foreign state even though the proceedings which led to
citizenship therein took place in the United States.1 2
A foreign state means a country which is not the
United States or its possession or colony and not as that
term is used in international law.'3 Under the former
definition, it has been held that occupied Japan' and
S6 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950). See S. RP. No.
1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 747 (1950).
187Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892).
188 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
18966 Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (23) (1958).
190 1940 Hearings 414-15.
191 Rueff v. Brownell, 116 F. Supp. 298 (D.NJ. 1953). Cf. Zimmer v.
Acheson, 191 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1951); Schaufus v. Attorney General of
the United States, 45 F. Supp. 61 (D. Md. 1942).
192 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
193 Uyeno v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 510, 515 (V.D. Wash. 1951). See
Kiletter v. Dulles, 111 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1953), aff'd sub nor. Kletter
v. Herter, 268 F.2d, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936(1960).
194 Acheson v. Kuniyuki, 189 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1951), rehearing denied,190 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 942 (1952).
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occupied Germany 1'5 and Italy while under allied military
government '98 were foreign states.
Under the 1907 Act, a foreign naturalization could have
occurred automatically without a formal judicial pro-
ceeding.19 7 Foreign citizenship automatically conferred by
operation of a foreign statute, 9 ' the repatriation of a
former citizen by a foreign country upon his entry into its
armed forces, 199 and the acquisition of a new nationality
by operation of a treaty designed primarily to transfer ter-
ritory 200 were all regarded as naturalizations. There was
no distinction whether the foreign nationality was acquired
directly or through a parent or husband.2"'
However, where naturalization in a foreign country
occurred by operation of law, such as by residence in a
foreign country or through the naturalization of a parent,
it was considered a permissive form of naturalization under
the 1907 Act. Loss of American citizenship did not result
prior to January 1941, unless acceptance of the foreign
nationality was manifested by an overt voluntary act which
clearly and unambiguously manifested a decision to accept
sulch foreign nationality." 2 Whether a particular act con-
stituted an overt act manifesting a voluntary acceptance
195 Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 833 (1952).
196 Matter of G., 4 I. & N. Dec. 521, 523 (BIA 1951). The current
Act defines a foreign state for all purposes thereof. It "includes outlying
possessions of a foreign state, but self-governing dominions or territories
under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign state."
66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (14) (1958). The 1940 Act did
not define a foreign state for all purposes thereof, but limited its definition
to the purposes of § 404 which provided for loss of citizenship by naturalized
citizens residing abroad. See 54 Stat 1137 (1940).
197 Matter of M., 6 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1953).
198 Matter of Picone, Interim Decision No. 1259 (Att'y Gen. 1963).
199 DeCicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1942).
200 Matter of G., 4 I. & N. Dec. 93, 97 (Central Office 1950) (dictum).
201 Matter of C., 8 I. & N. Dec. 511 (BIA 1959) ; Matter of K, 2 I. & N.
Dec. 598 (Central Office 1946); 3 HACKWORTH, INTMNATIONAL LAW 261-62
(1942). See Matter of K., supra note 175.
202 Matter of Picone, supra note 198; see Barsanti v. Acheson, 103 F.
Supp. 1011 (D. Mass. 1952), aff'd, 200 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1953); United
States v. Cuccaro, 138 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Matter of M., 6
I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1953); Matter of R., 6 I. & N. Dec. 15 (BIA
1953) ; Matter of G., supra note 200; Matter of P., 3 I. & N. Dec. 761
(Central Office 1949); Matter of V., 3 I. & N. Dec. 671 (BIA 1949).
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depended on the facts in each individual case.2"' Under
this concept, subsequent voluntary military service and
service on foreign government missions, °0 continuous travel
upon a foreign passport,203 joining the Fascist Party of
Italy," 6 membership in the Italian Fascist Confederation of
Agriculturists, for which only citizens of Italy were eligible,0 7
voting in political elections, 20 applying for and receiving
an Italian card of identity describing one as an Italian
national,205 and maintaining after majority a homestead
which had been acquired by applying for a foreign nation-
ality during minority,210 were all regarded as manifesting
an acceptance of the foreign nationality involuntarily ac-
quired and to effect expatriation under the 1907 Act, as of
the date of the act evidencing acceptance.21 It should be
noted that the act manifesting acceptance must have been
performed between 1907 and 1941 in view of the prospective
repeal of the 1907 Act by the 1940 Act.212  Further, since
a formal application to obtain foreign naturalization was
a prerequisite for expatriation under successor statutes, such
203 Matter of G., supra note 200, at 98.204 DeCicco v. Longo, .supra note 199.
205 Matter of P., mspra note 202; Matter of L., 3 1. & N. Dec. 98 (Central
Office 1947).
206 Barsanti v. Acheson, supra note 202; Matter of P., supra note 202;
Matter of V., supra note 202.207 In re Torchia, 113 F. Supp. 192 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
208 Matter of P., supra note 202.
209 Matter of M., 6 I. & N. Dec. 590 (BIA 1955).
210 Matter of G., 1 I. & N. Dec. 329 (BIA 1942).
211 Matter of Picone, supra note 198; Matter of DiP., 9 I. & N. Dec. 660
(BIA 1962). Prior to these cases it had been held that where there had
been an acceptance of the involuntary naturalization, loss of nationality
related back to the date upon which the nationality had been acquired.
This doctrine was re-examined and the retroactive feature modified for
the reason that the involuntary naturalization was regarded as a continuing
offer, the acceptance of which completed the naturalization. Since the act
of acceptance was probative only of intent at the time the act was performed,
expatriation was deemed to date from such act. In Picoine, the Attorney
General found it unnecessary to consider what acts constitute an acceptance
and what factual showing is required to establish their character. However,
in view of the nature of acts of acceptance, it is doubted whether he
intended to overrule previous decisions in this area.
212 Matter of Picone, supra note 198. In addition, § 408 of the 1940 Act
provides that nationality shall be lost solely from the performance of the
acts or fulfillments of the conditions specified and there is no provision
covering the acceptance of a foreign nationality acquired by operation of
law.
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naturalizations by operation of law did not affect a United
States citizen after January 1941.213
The 1940 Act modified the 1907 Act by requiring that
the foreign naturalization be obtained upon one's own
application or through the naturalization of a parent having
legal custody. There were provisos to the effect that when
the foreign naturalization was acquired through a parent
the child had until age twenty-three to return to this country,
and if he was still a dual national he was accorded an
additional two years (to January 13, 1943) to return." 4
This section provided for a definite method of election
and a definite period within which it must have been
made,2 15 granting such dual nationals, whether United States
citizens by birth or naturalization, the opportunity to elect
within two years of reaching majority the country to which
they chose to pledge allegiance.216 While the first part of
the statute was clearly prospective in its effect, the second
proviso applied to American citizens who, prior to its
passage and during their minority, had acquired foreign
citizenship through the naturalization of their parents217
and who were residing abroad at the time of its enactment.218
The statute did not affect one who, upon attaining majority
and prior to the effective date, had already made a valid
election to retain American citizenship and thereafter had
abided by such election. 9 The statute was not applicable
unless the parent also had been expatriated by such a
naturalization.22 On the other hand, it was applicable to
213 Matter of P., 9 I. & N. Dec. 362 (BIA 1961).
21454 Stat. 1168 (1940).
215 Matter of 0., 2 I. & N. Dec. 6 (BIA 1944).
216 Gaudio v. Dulles, 110 F. Supp. 706 (D.D.C. 1953). This has reference
to dual nationals who became American citizens either by birth or naturaliza-
tion and thereafter acquired a foreign nationality. If dual nationality status
was acquired at birth, an election to retain American citizenship is not
required. See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying text.
217 Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953).
218 Matter of M., I I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1943).
219Matter of G., 1 I. & N. Dec. 496 (BIA 1943). Similarly, it had
no application to one who had already been expatriated before it became
effective. Matter of S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 476 (BIA 1943).
220 Matter of Monastra, Interim Decision No. 1309 (Central Office 1963);
Matter of P., supra note 202.
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one who, although a dual national at birth, later lost the
foreign citizenship and subsequently reacquired it. 221
Where a person was still a dual national on the effective
date of the 1940 Act, he was given two years to return
to this country even though over twenty-three years of age
at that time.222  If he did not return by the statutory
deadline, citizenship was lost, unless the failure to return
was involuntary.223 Thus, American citizenship was re-
tained where a dual national did everything within his
power to return to the United States before the deadline
but was prevented from so doing because of the war,2
24
closing of American consulates,225 denial or delay of his
application by government officers 2 6 or inability to secure
transportation.22 However, such disabilities did not post-
pone forever the duty of making the choice to come here,228
since such choice must have been made within two years
after one was free to do so. 229  The current act extends
the time from twenty-three years of age to twenty-five for
a citizen to return to the United States if he had been
naturalized in a foreign state while under twenty-one years
of age 230
221 Dulles v. Iavarone, 221 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court further
held that the Secretary of State was required to show not only the father's
foreign naturalization and the derivative naturalization of the plaintiff,
but that his father also had legal custody of the plaintiff at the time
of his naturalization in the foreign state.
222Attorney General of the United States v. Ricketts, 165 F.2d 193 (9th
Cir. 1947); Matter of S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 481, 482-83 (Att'y Gen. 1943).
This two-year limitation applied to the application by the citizen for per-
mission to come to the United States and not to the time of his actual
arrival. Perri v. Dulles, supra note 217.
223 In the Matter of Bernasconi, 113 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1953).224 Perduzzi v. Brownell, 113 F. Supp. 419 (D.D.C. 1953); In the Matter
of Bernasconi, supra note 223; Matter of M., 6 I. & N. Dec. 590, 592 (BIA
1955). .225 Perduzzi v. Brownell, supra note 224.
226Perri v. Dulles, supra note 217; Moldoveanu v. Dulles, 168 F. Supp. 1,
7 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
227 Perri v. Dulles, spra note 217.
228 1n the Matter of Bernasconi, supra note 223, at 75.229 Perri v. Dulles, supra note 217; Matter of M., supra note 224. See
also Perduzzi v. Brownell, supra note 224.
23066 Stat 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1958): "From and after
the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of the United
States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by-
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application
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By an Oath of Allegiance to a Foreign State
Prior to the enactment of the 1907 Act, there had been
a lack of uniformity concerning the effect upon American
citizenship of an oath of allegiance to a foreign state.23'
After March 2, 1907, the taking of such an oath caused
loss of nationality.232  The 1940 Act substantially re-enacted
this provision, expanding it to include an affirmation or
other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state.2
33
The current statute continued the language of the 1940
Act but included political subdivisions of foreign states as
well as the foreign state itself." 4
What constitutes an oath of allegiance is determined
by its spirit and meaning and not the letter. The test is
whether the oath taken places the person taking it in
complete subjection to the state to which it is taken, at
least for the period of the contract, so that it is impossible
for him to perform the obligations of citizenship to this
filed in his behalf by a parent, guardian, or duly authorized agent, or through
the naturalization of a parent having legal custody of such person:
Provided, That nationality shall not be lost by any person under this section
as the result of the naturalization of a parent or parents while such person
is under the age of twenty-one years, or as the result of a naturalization
obtained on behalf of a person under twenty-one years of age by a parent,
guardian, or duly authorized agent, unless such person shall fail to enter
the United States to establish a permanent residence prior to his twenty-fifth
birthday. . . ." This extension was enacted for the benefit of those citizens
who were caught abroad during the war and who were unable, through no
fault of their own, to return to this country within the time required by
the 1940 Act. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 748 (1950). See
Matter of C., 8 I. & N. Dec. 511 (BIA 1959).
231 3 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 201, at 217-18. In the absence of
a statutory declaration or federal court decision, the State Department took
the view that an oath of allegiance taken prior to March 2, 1907, did not
expatriate. Ibid. In United States ex rel. Francassi v. Karnuth, 19 F. Supp.
581, 583 (W.D.N.Y. 1937), the court commented that the 1907 Act was
merely declaratory of the law as it had long been recognized.
23234 Stat. 1228 (1907). This provision was included in the Act to
prevent one from deliberately placing himself in a position where)his services
might be claimed by more than one government and his allegiance due to
more than one: H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1906).
23354 Stat 1168 (1940). Since some governments do not recognize the
"oath" which has a religious connotation, it was deemed desirable to expand
the rule to include the affirmation or formal declaration. 1940 Hearings
490.
23466 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1481(a)(2) (1958).
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country.235  Such an oath contemplates a solemn, formal
and binding obligation to serve a foreign state,3 6 made in
the presence of a person authorized to administer it,
237
and acceptance thereof by the foreign state in accordance
with its laws.238 There must be evidence in the record
that it was in fact taken239 and not merely subscribed
to.240 If such an oath of allegiance were taken, it was no
defense to expatriation that allegiance to the United States
was not specifically abjured therein, 12 4  that the oath was
not legally valid for the purpose of gaining foreign citizen-
ship,242 that it was limited for only a specified time,243 that
it had been taken to a sovereign and not to a foreign
state,244 that one had been subsequently discharged from
2353 HACKWORTH, op. cit. spra note 201, at 219-20. Matter of T., 1 I.
& N. Dec. 596 (BIA 1943). In its application to the facts of that case,
it was held that although the words "fealty" and "allegiance" might be used
interchangeably, where "fealty" was regarded by the foreign government as
having a special meaning-a loyalty less than allegiance-and was ad-
ministered to persons who were not nationals of the foreign country
with the understanding that their own citizenship would be retained, an oath
of "fealty" was not an oath of allegiance within the meaning of the
statute.
236 Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
237 Matter of E., 1 I. & N. Dec. 641 (BIA 1943).238 Gillars v. United States, supra note 236; Matter of L., 1 I. & N. Dec.
317 (BIA 1942).
239 Matter of M., 6 I. & N. Dec. 641 (BIA 1955). Where foreign law
required that every male entering the foreign military service take an oath
of allegiance to that country, there is a presumption that the law had been
complied with. United States ex reL. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F.2d 219 (W.D.
Pa. 1929). See also United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, 6 F.2d 957
(2d Cir. 1925); Zimmer v. Acheson, 91 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D. Kan. 1950),
aff'd, 191 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1951).
See also Grassi v. Acheson, 101 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1951), where
the court held that the oath had been taken where the citizen was present
when the oath was administered to the group entering the foreign armed
forces. Since there must now be more than inference, hypothesis or surmise
before a person can be stripped of his citizenship, Acheson v. Maenza, 202
F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953), a mere denial that the oath was taken, or
evidence that actual practice departed from the rule, makes this presumption
ineffective. Monaco v. Dulles, 210 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1954).
240 Matter of E., supra note 237.
241 See Ex parte Griffin, 237 Fed. 445, 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1916). Cf. Fletes-
Mora v. Rogers, 160 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Cal. 1958), which held that if
allegiance to the United States is not renounced or no declaration of
allegiance to a foreign state is contained therein, no oath of allegiance has
been taken.242 Revedin v. Acheson, 194 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
820 (1952).
243 Ex parte Griffin, mspra note 241, at 458.
244 Ex parte Griffin, supra note 241.
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the armed forces of a foreign state upon the ground that
he was not a citizen thereof, 245 or that it was in a foreign
language of which the citizen was ignorant where, under
the circumstances, the citizen recognized that she was taking
an oath of allegiance.246 Conversely, citizenship was not
lost by the taking of an oath of allegiance to a foreign
state in connection with employment by a private company
pursuant to its regulations where the oath was not required,
authorized or accepted by the foreign state,247 or where
it was administered contrary to or in violation of the laws
of the foreign country.2 41
An oath of allegiance taken in connection with entry
into the armed forces of a foreign country terminated citizen-
ship under these statutory provisions provided it was not
taken under circumstances amounting to duress.2 49  If it
was taken as a concomitant to conscription by one required
to submit to a foreign draft law or suffer punishment as
an alternative, expatriation did not result.2
50
It must be remembered that oaths of allegiance taken
during World War I did not expatriate under the 1907
Act in light of the express prohibition thereof, but that
such oaths could be effectively confirmed after the wartime
245 United States ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth, 14 F. Supp. 770 (W.D.N.Y.
1936).2 4 6 Revedin v. Acheson, supra note 242. In Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1952), the Supreme Court stated that where a dual
national of this country and Japan had intended to renounce his American
citizenship, his facing the East each morning and paying his respects to
the emperor, signing a Japanese family census register and changing his
registration as an alien with the police and a university, might suggest the
making of a formal declaration of allegiance to Japan within the meaning
of this section.
247 Matter of B., 1 I. & N. Dec. 673 (BIA 1943); Matter of L., supra
note 238.
248 Matter of N., 6 I. & N. Dec. 792 (BIA 1955). In that case,
a citizen took an oath of allegiance to Canada upon entry into the Canadian
armed forces. Canadian Orders in Council, then in effect, did not require
an oath by one not a Canadian national where the taking of such an oath
would cause loss of nationality under the laws of the country of which the
person was a citizen.
249 Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950); Dos Reis ex rel.
Camara v. Nicholls, 161 F.2d 860 (lst Cir. 1947); Matter of C., 3 I. & N.
Dec. 586 (BIA 1949).
250 Matter of V., 5 I. & N. Dec. 497 (BIA 1953) ; Matter of S., 3 I. &
N. Dec. 701 (BIA 1949).
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period by clear and unequivocal acts denoting a continued
allegiance to the foreign state and an intention to relinquish
American citizenship.25' Similarly, oaths of allegiance which
were non-expatriating because taken during minority could
be confirmed after attaining majority by a course of conduct
having a direct relationship to the purpose for which the
oath was taken with a resulting loss of citizenship under
that Act."5 Where the oath of allegiance was effectively
confirmed in peacetime, nationality was deemed lost under
the 1907 Act as of the date the confirmatory act was
performed. 25
3
By Service in a Foreign Armed Forces
Prior to January 1941 mere service in the armed
forces of a foreign state did not affect citizenship. 5 4 If
one had or acquired the nationality of a foreign state, such
service, per se, became grounds for loss of citizenship under
the 1940 Act, unless such service was expressly authorized
by our law.255  This legislation was based upon the theory
that one who had voluntarily entered or continued to serve
in the army of a foreign state, thus offering his all in
support of such state, should be deemed to have transferred
251 Matter of S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 604 (Regional Comm'r 1960).
252 Matter of W., 4 I. & N. Dec. 22 (Central Office 1950). In that case
a minor took an oath of allegiance to Canada in order to teach school and
entered into a contract for that purpose. After reaching majority, she
voluntarily entered into a new contractual relationship to teach school. This
course of conduct was held to amount to an affirmation of the oath. Cf.
Mazza v. Acheson, 104 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (in which inder
the facts of that case it was held that subsequent acts confirmed the
oath taken during minority); Riccio v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 680 (D.D.C.
1953) (in which confirmation was not found).
253Matter of Amico, Interim Decision No. 1299 (BIA 1963). Where
oaths of allegiance taken during wartime were subsequently confirmed after
the war, the "relation back" theory had been followed and nationality was
held lost as of July 2, 1921. Matter of S., supra note 251. The modification
of this principle in connection with acceptance of foreign nationality in-
voluntarily acquired, was deemed applicable to oaths of allegiance taken
during wartime and during minority, and the prior view was abandoned.
254 Ferri v. Dulles, supra note 217; Ex parte Griffin, supra note 241;
See Soccodato v. Dulles. 226 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Acheson v. Maenza,
202 F.2d 453. 457 (D.C. Cir. 1953). However, if an oath of allegiance
was voluntarily taken in connection with such service, citizenship would have
been lost under the 1907 Act. Parachini v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 184
(S.D.N.Y. 1952): Matter of A., 2 I. & N. Dec. 304 (BIA 1945).
25554 Stat. 1168 (1940).
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his allegiance to that state.256 The words "unless authorized
by the laws of the United States" were intended to relate
not only to statutes of this country providing for service
of American nationals in foreign armies, but also to con-
ventions concluded by this government with other countries
under which each of the parties was allowed to draft
persons having the nationality of the other under certain
conditions. 5 This language was also applicable to certain
executive agreements made by the President with many
foreign countries during World War II permitting similar
foreign military service without expatriation.258 However,
where such an agreement was not applicable, e.g., where it
did not cover dual nationals of both countries, such service
would cause expatriation. 29 The military service contem-
plated by this statute was only that part of the foreign
armed forces which was activated or subject to active
military duty.2"' Service in an officers' training corps which
did not subject one to liability for active duty,26' in a
home defense force during a period when it was not
activated,6 2 or employment by a munitions corporation
controlled by and under the orders of the armed forces of a
foreign state 2 was not within the purview of this statute.
Such service did not result in loss of nationality if one
did not have foreign nationality at the time of service,
256 1940 Hearings 490; Matter of A., supra note 254, at 307. An
excellent discussion of the legislative history of this section is contained
in Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicholls, supra note 249, at 863-66.
257 1940 Hearings 490. Such conventions were concluded with Canada,
France, Great Britain, Greece and Italy during World War I.
258 Matter of K., 2 I. & N. Dec. 243 (BIA 1945). See S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 749 (1950), for the countries with which such Executive
Agreements were made. It should be noted that these Executive Agreements
covered only draft service and were not broad enough to include voluntary
enlistments.
259 Matter of S., 2 I. & N. Dec. 783 (Central Office 1947). In that
case, the Executive Agreement with Canada permitted only citizens of one
country who were residing in the other country as "aliens" to be drafted
into the armed forces of the latter. Since no provision was made for dual
nationals, it was held that one who was a citizen of both the United States
and Canada would lose American citizenship upon voluntary enlistment in the
Canadian armed forces.
260 Matter of Z., 2 I. & N. Dec. 346 (BIA 1945).
261 Matter of L., 2 I. & N. Dec. 455 (Central Office 1946).
262 Matter of S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1959).2 6 3 Kawakita v. United States, supra note 246.
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or did not acquire such nationality by reason of such
service."' Even though a native of the United States
also had possessed a foreign nationality, if he had lost
such foreign nationality prior to his entry into the foreign
armed forces, such service did not expatriate.36
Although this statute was prospective in operation, 5
if a citizen entered the armed forces of a foreign state
prior to January 1941, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
but continued to serve after that date, expatriation could
result if such continued service was voluntary.267 Thus,
where one continued to serve after being offered a choice of
discharge or continued service,268 or could have secured
release on the ground of American citizenship, foreign law,
or otherwise,2 9 continued service was construed as voluntary
and expatriating. Similarly, where one claimed that he had
involuntarily entered the German armed forces prior to
January 1941 but continued to serve thereafter as a spy,
citizenship was held to have been lost.2 17  However, if one
was drafted into the foreign army prior to January 1941,
and subsequent service therein was under the original draft,
such service was prima facie involuntary.27 1
The 1952 Act modified this basis for expatriation by
eliminating the necessity that the expatriate have or acquire
the nationality of the foreign state,272 and by requiring, in
lieu of a general statutory authorization, a specific authoriza-
tion by the Secretaries of State and Defense to enter or
serve in foreign armed forces to avoid nationality loss. 273
264 Matter of T., 1 I. & N. Dec. 596 (BIA 1943).
265 Matter of N., 1 I. & N. Dec. 272 (BIA 1942).
266 Matter of A., stpra note 254. See Scardino v. Acheson, 113 F. Supp.
754 (D.N.J. 1953).
267 See Perri v. Dulles, supra note 217, at 589; Matter of A., supra note
254.
268 Matter of A., supra note 254, at 310.
260 Perri v. Dulles, 206 F2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953).2 70 Bauer v. Clark, 161 F2d 397 (7th Cir. 1947).
271 Perri v. Dulles, supra note 269.
272 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 130 n.1 (1958). This was
predicated upon the desire to make the statutory provisions uniformly ap-
plicable to all persons who served in foreign armed forces and to eliminate
dependency upon foreign law. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
749 (1950).
27366 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1481(a)(3) (1958).
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It also contained a new provision to the effect that a person
who entered foreign armed forces while under eighteen years
of age could lose nationality if there existed an option to
secure a release from such service and he failed to exercise
that option when he became eighteen years of age.274  This
provision has been interpreted similarly to its predecessor
in the 1940 Act, to wit, where service commenced prior to
its effective date and continued thereafter, its provisions
are not applicable if there is nothing to indicate that release
from service could have been secured. 5  It has also been
administratively held that only specific authorization from
the Secretaries of State and Defense can avoid expatriation
and that permission from a local draft board to enter the
armed forces of a foreign state is not sufficient17 ' Although
the constitutionality of this statute has been sustained by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States
ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, certiorari has been granted by the
Supreme Court. 7
7
By Foreign Government Employment
Prior to January 1941 there was no statutory provision
with respect to the effect upon citizenship of accepting
public employment. It was believed that such employment
was, under certain conditions, an act amounting to re-
nunciation of United States citizenship and a willingness
to submit to or adopt the obligations of the country in
274 Although the legislative history contains no explanation for this addition,
it was apparently designed to make statutory the view which was being
administratively followed under the 1940 Act. See Matter of R., 3 I. & N.
Dec. 470, 473 (Central Office 1949).
275 Matter of P., 8 I. & N. Dec. 194 (B1A 1958). In such a case the
conclusive presumption of voluntariness is not applicable. Id. at 198.
276 Matter of D., 5 I. & N. Dec. 674 (BIA 1954).
277315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 810 (1963). That
case also held that service in the rebel army of Cuba after January 1,
1959, the date upon which Castro came to power, constitutes service in
the armed forces of a foreign state. This point has also been raised in the
appeal to the Supreme Court.
The constitutional questions presented to the Supreme Court will be:
(1) whether this statute imposes cruel and unusual punishment; (2) whether
it is an improper and unconstitutional exercise of power; and (3) whether




which the person resided and, therefore, should be treated
as expatriation."' The 1940 Act made this principle statu-
tory by providing that the acceptance or performance of
the duties of an office, post or employment under the
government of a foreign state for which only nationals of
such state were eligible was a cause of expatriation. '79
The current act changed this provision by eliminating the
requirement that the employment be limited to nationals
of the foreign state, providing instead that its terms are
applicable to dual nationals, and added employment for
which an oath, affirmation or declaration of allegiance is
required.8 °
Under the 1940 Act, the words "under the government
of a foreign state" meant the relationship that public
employees have with their government or with the bureaus
or corporations which are government owned 28' and con-
27814 Ops. ATFY GEN. 295, 297 (1873). See also Kawakita v. United
States, .supra note 246; cf. H.R_ Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess.
163 (1906) to the effect that the performance of duties of a consul for
another country had no effect upon the citizenship of the person so acting.
27954 Stat. 1169 (1940). This provision was intended to be applicable
to dual nationals of this country and the foreign state, including naturalized
citizens of the United States who came from countries which did not
recognize the right of expatriation or which had declined to enter into
naturalization treaties. Its meaning and desirability seemed to require little
explanation, in view of the aim to prevent embroilments with foreign govern-
ments in cases of persons who reside in foreign countries and have to all
intents and purposes abandoned the United States. 1940 Hearings 490,
514.
28066 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958). The change from the
1940 Act was intended to strengthen the law and make for an elimination
of dual citizenship. It was found that the 1940 Act did not, in many
cases, affect dual nationals. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 748-49
(1950).
Where employment commenced prior to the effective date of the current
Act, and continued thereafter, expatriation under the 1952 Act was found.
Matter of L., 9 I. & N. Dec. 313 (BIA 1961).
281 Kawakita v. United States, supra note 246.
In Kamada v. Dulles, 145 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1956), in dictum,
the court stated that the statute was "intended to encompass service in
or on behalf of a foreign government, the performance of which required
absolute allegiance to the employing government and necessarily excluded
allegiance to our government." Id. at 459. Administratively, the position
is taken that the test is not whether the employment is inconsistent with
retention of allegiance to the United States, but whether the employment
is under the government of a foreign state and that the person employed
had the nationality of the foreign state. Matter of L., stepra note 280,
at 319.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
trolled. Thus, employment as a police officer in Mexico,282
or as a second mate on a Norwegian vessel 283 was held
to come within the purview of the statute, whereas em-
ployment by a private company whose business was super-
vised and whose labor supply was controlled by the foreign
government in time of war did not.284 Whether employment
as a school teacher is of the nature contemplated by this
statute evoked a difference of opinion. Administratively
it has been held that such employment under the conditions
specified in the statute causes loss of nationality; 285 whereas,
judicially there is dicta to the effect that it does not.2 8
The requirement that the employment be such for which
only nationals of the foreign state are eligible has been
narrowly construed. It has been held that the statute was
not applicable where: (1) the employment was not restricted
to nationals of the foreign state,287  (2) was available to
persons who had commenced proceedings to become nationals
of the foreign country,28  (3) the foreign statute generally
permitted only nationals to be so employed but "foreign"
workers could be substituted in the absence of qualified
technicians,289 (4) the foreign statute limiting employment
to nationals was not enforced or even considered,29 and
(5) the foreign itatute did not clearly establish that positions
282Elizarraraz v. Brownell, 217 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1954); Matter of
M., 2 I. & N. Dec. 363 (BIA 1945).
283 Matter of L., 3 I. & N. Dec. 98 (Central Office 1947).
284 Kawkakita v. United States, supra note 246. In Naito v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 770 (S.D. Cal. 1952), employment as a clerical assistant to
the paymaster sergeant at an army provision depot, and in Foruno v.
Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Cal. 1952), employment in the engine
room on foreign government ferry boats were considered but not decided.
285 Matter of L., 9 I. & N. Dec. 313 (BIA 1961); Matter of G., 4 I. & N.
Dec. 521 (BIA 1951).286 Kamada v. Dulles, supra note 281. That case was decided in favor of
citizenship on the ground that the employment was the result of economic
duress. In Oye v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1953), the court
did not reach this issue but found that the government had failed to sustain
its burden of proof on the issue that only foreign nationals were eligible for
the employment. See also Dulles v. Katamoto, 256 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1958).
287 Matter of W., 2 I. & N. Dec. 231 (BIA 1945); Matter of R., 2 I. & N.
Dec. 60 (BIA 1944).
288 Matter of S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 304 (BIA 1942).
289Matter of S., 2 I. & N. Dec. 57 (BIA 1944).
290 Matter of G., supra note 285, at 523.
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were available only to nationals.29' Similarly, it has been
held that a conclusion that such government employment
was restricted to nationals of the foreign state was un-
warranted merely because the foreign nationality statute
exempted government workers from loss of that status until
termination of the employment,292 or where a foreign pension
law provided for loss of pension rights upon loss of the
foreign nationality.2 3 Whether foreign law requires the em-
ployee to have the nationality of that state has been held
to be a question of fact. Whether the employment is under
the government of the foreign state must be established
by reference to the constitution, laws and regulations of the
foreign state and by properly authenticated documents.294
By Voting in a Foreign Political Election
Prior to January 1941, voting in a foreign political
election did not, of itself, result in loss of citizenship.29
Motivated by the belief that taking an active part in the
political affairs of a foreign state by voting involved a
political attachment and practical allegiance to that state,
which was inconsistent with continued allegiance to this
country,296 Congress made such voting or participation in
an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory a ground for loss of nationality. 297 This
is continued without change in the current act.2"'
Under the 1940 Act, a political election was defined
as the act of choosing by vote a person to fill an office
which pertains to the conduct of government.2 9 Voting
291See Dulles v. Katamoto, supra note 286.292 0ye v. Acheson, supra note 286.293 Naito v. Acheson, mipra note 284.
294 Matter of Hernandez, Interim Decision No. 1289 (BIA 1963).
295 Matter of M., 1 I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1943). It should be noted
that voting may have had an expatriating effect under the 1907 Act where
it was an act of acceptance of a foreign nationality previously involuntarily
acquired, or of confirmation of an act performed while under a disability.
296 1940 Hearings 490. See also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 54
(1958).
29754 Stat 1169 (1940). Its constitutionality was upheld in Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
29866 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1958).
2
99 Kuvwhara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
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for candidates for office is a prime requisite. 0  Classes
of elections, non-political in the colloquial sense, in which
participation by Americans could not possibly have any
effect on the relations of the United States with another
country, are excluded. 0 1 Thus, a plebiscite to determine
whether a foreign government should be released from
obligations arising out of past commitments restricting the
methods of raising men for military service,30 2 and a plebiscite
to permit the voters to express approval or disapproval of
the manner in which the country had been governed by
an individual 03 were held not to come within this section.
However, where the election is a political one, its scope,
whether local or national, is immaterial.0 4 Thus, voting
for a president, a mayor, a member of a city council, in
a local primary election, or to choose an assembly for a
state can all result in expatriation. 0 Even though one
did not have the legal right to vote in the foreign election
nationality was lost upon voting.3 6 Moreover, this statute
was intended to apply to Americans who voted in a foreign
state whether or not they were nationals thereof and,
therefore, it was held that the fact that one was not a
national of the foreign state in which he voted did not
prevent expatriation.3 0 7  The fact that elections were held
in countries which were occupied subsequent to World War
II did not change their character as political elections.
Thus, elections held in the American-occupied zone of
Germany,30 8 occupied Japan, 09 the British-occupied zone of
3 0 0 Moldoveanu v. Dulles, 168 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
301 Perez v. Brownell, supra note 297, at 59-60.
302 Matter of H., 1 . & N. Dec. 239 (BIA 1942).
303 Moldoveanu. v. Dulles, supra note 300.
304 Bisceglia v. Clark, 196 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
305 See Perez v. Brownell, sua note 297; Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196
F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bisceglia v. Clark, supra note 304; Miranda
v. Clark, 180 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1950); Matter of P., 1 I. & N. Dec. 267
(BIA 1942).
306 Matter of A., 2 I. & N. Dec. 82 (BIA 1944) (falsely claimed to be a
national); Matter of N., 3 I. & N. Dec. 829 (Central Office 1949) (under
age specified by the foreign law).
307 Matter of A., supra note 306.
3 0 8 Acheson v. Wohlmuth, supra note 305.
809 Acheson v. Kuniyuki, 190 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 942 (1952). This case overruled several district court cases holding
to the contrary and Congress confirmed the holding in the Kimiyuki case
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Germany,"' and Russian-occupied Hungary 1  were deemed
within the purview of this statute.
By Formal Renunciat'ion in a Foreign State
Prior to January 1941, it was believed that a formal
renunciation of United States citizenship abroad should
be regarded as an act of expatriation, if the renunciant
emigrated to a foreign country and took the renunciatory
action with a view of acquiring its nationality. 2 The first
statutory provision respecting this method of expatriation
was contained in the 1940 Act,313 and the 1952 Act continues
it without change.3 14 These statutes required that the re-
nunciation be before a diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States, that it take place in a foreign state, and
that it be in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State.
If not taken before a diplomatic or consular officer in a
foreign state it is a nullity and does not forfeit citizenship. 315
by the Act of July 20, 1954, 68 Stat. 495-96, which, for a period of two
years, permitted United States citizens who had lost citizenship solely by
voting in specified Japanese elections to be expeditiously restored to citizenship.
31O Matter of H., 4 I. & N. Dec. 486 (Central Office 1951).
311 Kazdy-Reich v. Marshall, 88 F. Supp. 787 (D.D.C. 1950).
31214 Ops. ATiY GEN. 295 (1873).
31354 Stat 1169 (1940). This statute was designed for the use of dual
nationals who elected on reaching majority the nationality of the foreign
state, but could not otherwise divest themselves of American nationality,
e.g., by naturalization or an oath of allegiance, because they already possessed
the foreign nationality; or American nationals who, upon marrying aliens,
acquired the nationality of the spouse and wished to terminate their American
citizenship. 1940 Hearings 491.
31466 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1481(a)(6) (1958). The State De-
partment regulations provide for a prescribed form to be executed in quad-
ruplicate and approved by that department. See 22 C.F.R. §§50.1-.2(1958).
315 In the Matter of Bautista, 183 F. Supp. 271 (D. Guam 1960); In the
Matter of H., 9 I. & N. Dec. 411 (BIA 1961). In these cases formal
renunciations were made before a notary public.
In considering this means of relinquishing citizenship, the technical mean-
ing of the word "renunciation" must be borne in mind. Courts have found
no "renunciations" of nationality where the provisions of these sections
have not been involved. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S.
717 (1952); Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958). They have
apparently employed the term in its general sense of "an act of giving up or
abandoning."
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By Formal Renunciation in the United States
Prior to the amendment of the 1940 Act in July 1944,18
formal renunciations of American nationality in the United
States had been permitted only as an adjunct of marriage.
Under the 1907 Act, a woman who obtained citizenship by
marriage to a citizen of the United States "I could renounce
that citizenship before a naturalization court upon termina-
tion of the marriage.38  Although ,the prohibition against
expatriation in wartime was applicable, a formal renuncia-
tion made during this period was regarded as effective upon
termination of the war where a woman was still unmarried
and manifested no intention to retain her citizenship." 9
This portion of the 1907 Act was repealed in 1922,320
and replaced by a provision permitting any woman citizen
who was married to an alien after September 22, 1922, to
make a formal renunciation of her allegiance before a
naturalization court.32' No substantial change was made
until 1934, when it was provided that any citizen, male
or female, could upon marriage to a foreigner formally
renounce citizenship before a naturalization court, in peace-
time only. There was also a provision for voiding such a
renunciation if war was declared within one year there-
after.322
This, in turn, was repealed by the 1940 Act,121 which
made no provision for loss of nationality by a formal re-
nunciation thereof in the United States. In 1944, however,
this method of relinquishing citizenship was added,8 24 and
it is continued without change in the current act. 2' To
31658 Stat. 677 (1944).
31710 Stat 604 (1855).
31834 Stat. 1228 (1907).
319 This was the long standing view of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service based on unpublished precedents. It followed the general principle
of regarding expatriating, acts, such as foreign naturalizations and marriage
to a foreigner, performed during the restrictive period, as effective where
the tondition still existed upon termination of the war.
82042 Stat. 1021 (1922).
321 Ibid. Such a formal renunciation could not be made before a consular
officer abroad. See 3 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 263-64 (1942).
322 48 Stat. 797 (1934).
323 54 Stat. 1172 (1940).
324 58 Stat. 677 (1944).
32566 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1481(a)(3) (1958).
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be effective such a renunciation can only be made in time
of war. It must be in writing, in a form prescribed by
the Attorney General, before an officer designated by him,
and approved by the Attorney General.2 6
Inasmuch as this statute was not originally included
in the 1940 Act, no provision was made with respect to
the age at which a formal renunciation could be made in
the United States. Absent such a provision, the common-
law rule was applicable, and one under the age of twenty-
one years could not divest himself of citizenship by this
means.32 7  The 1952 Act is also silent with respect to the
age at which such a renunciation may be made.2 s In
view of the established principle that doubts as to facts
and law should be resolved in favor of citizenship, it is
believed that the common-law rule will also be applied,
and a renunciation made by one under twenty-one years of
age will be held invalid. The provisions of the statute
expressly except it from the restriction as to acts performed
in the United States and if such a formal renunciation were
made, nationality would be lost thereby even though a sub-
sequent residence abroad was not taken up.3 29
By Conviction for Treason
The 1940 Act contained the first provision relating to
expatriation based upon a conviction for treason. 3 This
ground was continued in the 1952 Act.33 In 1954, that
Act was amended by adding convictions for acts or con-
spiracies involving rebellion or insurrection, sedition, and
advocating the overthrow of the government.3 2  This cause
326 Ibid.327McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951).
328See 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.s.C. § 1483(b) (1958). The legislative
history contains no indication as to the reason for its exclusion.
329 But see Acheson v. Murakarni, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949), where
thousands of formal renunciations by citizens of Japanese ancestry during
World War II were held ineffective because of conditions existing at the
relocation center.
330 54 Stat. 1169 (1940).
33166 Stat. 267 (1952).
33268 Stat. 1146 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (9) (1958).
The definition of treason is contained in the Constitution: "Treason
against the United States, shall consist oily in levying War against them,
or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S.
19641
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of loss of nationality was specifically exempted from the
restrictions as to acts performed in the United States,
333
and excluded from the limitation as to the age at which
expatriating acts may be performed . 3 4  Although there have
been cases in which American citizens have been con-
victed of treason, the effect of such a conviction upon
citizenship status has not as yet been commented upon by
the courts.
3 35
By Desertion from the Armed Forces or Draft Evasion
Statutes relating to forfeiture of citizenship rights upon
desertion from the armed forces and leaving the jurisdiction
of the United States to avoid a draft were first enacted
in 1865.336 These statutes were amended in 1912 to make
them inapplicable to peace time desertions or departures,
337
and were repealed by the 1940 Act.338 That Act declared
that nationality was lost if there was a court martial
conviction for deserting the military or naval service of the
United States in time of war.3 39 The current act continues
this provision without substantial change. 4 °
Although it repealed the previous statute with respect
to leaving the jurisdiction of the United States to avoid
the draft, the 1940 Act, as enacted, made no provision
for expatriation upon this ground, and it was not until
1944 that it was restored. 4 ' The 1952 Act added a pre-
sumption that a departure during war time or a period of
national emergency was for this purpose when there was
a failure to comply with any provision of the compulsory
service law.3 4 2
CONST. art. III, §3. It may be committed within the United States or
abroad. Kawakita v. United States, supra note 315.
33366 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a) (1958).
334 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1483(f) (1958).
335 See Kawakita v. United States, supra note 315; Gillars v. United States,
182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
33613 Stat. 490-91 (1865).
33737 Stat. 356 (1912).
33854 Stat. 1172-74 (1940).
33954 Stat. 1168-69 (1940), as amended, 58 Stat. 4 (1944).
34066 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958).
34158 Stat. 746 (1944).
34266 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958).
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These provisions for expatriation for desertion or for
evading the draft, however, have been held to be uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court. In Trop v. Dulles,343
the Court held that expatriation for desertion was a cruel
and unusual punishment and thus violative of the eighth
amendment. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,3 " the Court
held that the statutes relating to loss of citizenship for
evasion of the draft lacked the procedural safeguards guar-
anteed by the fifth and sixth amendments.
By Naturalized Citizens Residing Abroad
Prior to 1907 mere residence in a foreign country
by a naturalized American generally had no effect upon the
person's citizenship. 45 Nationality could be lost only by
operation of a treaty. 46 Increasing numbers of Americans
were leaving the United States and living within the jur-
isdiction of foreign countries and their protection caused
increasing embarrassment to this government in its relations
with foreign powers. This circumstance, coupled with the
fact that naturalized citizens were more apt to go abroad
than native citizens 4 ' and to become merged with the
native population,348 prompted Congress to enact the 1907
Act. This statute contained a rebuttable presumption that
when a naturalized citizen resided for two years in the
foreign state from which he came or for five years in any
343356 U.S. 86 (1958).
344372 U.S. 144 (1963).
345 United States ex rel. Anderson v. Howe, 231 Fed. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
Cf. Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302, 305 (D.D.C. 1963), prob. jurs.
noted, 375 U.S. 893 (1963), to the effect that prior to 1907, the State
Department considered in many instances that a naturalized citizen who re-
turned to his native land for a protracted period had expatriated himself, or
forfeited the protection of this government, especially if he manifested no
intention of returning to the United States. However, exceptions were made
for citizens who resided abroad in extension of legitimate American enter-
prises or who were prevented by pecuniary or other good reasons from
returning to this country. 3 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 321, at
288.
As to what constitutes naturalization, see note 190 supra and accompanying
text.346 For discussion of these treaties, see note 143 supra and accompanying
text.
347 H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 27 (1906).
348 1940 Hearings 496.
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foreign state, he ceased to be a citizen. It defined the
place of residence as the place of general abode. 49 This
presumption was easy to overcome; '50 but a conflict arose
as to whether its effect, if not rebutted, was to cause
expatriation or simply to relieve the United States of the
obligation to protect such citizens who had resided abroad
beyond the specified limits.3 5' Administratively the latter
position has been taken and the presumption is not regarded
as equivalent to loss of nationality.352
During its consideration of the 1940 Act, Congress was
very much concerned with avoiding our government's em-
broilment in controversies with foreign states. In the belief
that the presumption of the 1907 Act had proved inadequate
and unreasonable because the protection of the United
States was denied to persons who had remained citizens,353
it was expressly provided in the 1940 Act that nationality
itself would be automatically lost by naturalized citizens
who had continuously resided in specified foreign states
for two, three or five years.354 In order to prevent un-
34934 Stat. 1228 (1907).
350 United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353 (1924).
351 See Rosasco v. Brownell, 163 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) and cases
cited therein.
352 See 28 Ops. ArF'Y GE N. 504 (1910); 3 HACKWORTH, op. Cit. sapra
note 321, at 294-95. Cf. Rosasco v. Brownell, .stpra note 351. It should be
noted that there was a period when the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the State Department interpreted the presumption as affecting
citizenship status and failure to rebut it resulted in expatriation. Matter
of K., 1 1. & N. Dec. 587 (BIA 1943); Matter of G., 1 I. & N. Dec. 398
(BIA 1943) ; 3 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 321, at 294.
Although the 1940 Act repealed the 1907 Act, a savings clause continued
the presumption where applicable.
353 1940 Hearings 490. Additional reasons advanced were that transmitting
of American nationality would be prevented and since admission of an alien
to citizenship is subject to the condition that he intended to reside permanently
in the United States, termination of citizenship should follow abandonment
of residence.
35454 Stat. 1170 (1940): "A person who has become a national by
riaturalization shall lose his nationality by:
(a) Residing for at least two years in the territory of a foreign state
of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his birth is
situated, if he acquires through such residence the nationality of such foreign
state by operation of the law thereof ; or
(b) Residing continuously for three years in the territory of a foreign
state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of his birth
is situated except as provided in Section 406 hereof.
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necessary hardships, naturalized citizens residing abroad at
the time of passage of the act were allowed a reasonable
time to return and, thus, preserve their American citizen-
ship. 55 In fact, citizenship could not be lost under these
sections before October 14, 1946.150
The 1952 Act eliminated the provision relevant to loss
of citizenship by residence for two years in a foreign state,s'
and continued the three and five-year provisions of the 1940
Act.358  Its provisions were made retroactive to include
residence abroad commenced prior to December 24, 1952,
and expressly stated that residence abroad in certain ex-
cepted categories was not to be computed in the quantum
of residence. 359 It also made certain that the residence could
be in more than one foreign state.3 60
Provision had also been made in the 1940 Act for loss
of nationality by minors residing in a foreign state with,
or under the legal custody of, a parent who was expatriated
under its pertinent sections, if the child did not acquire a
permanent residence in this country before the age of twenty-
three years.3 ' This provision is continued in the current
(c) Residing continuously for five years in any other foreign state,
except as provided in Section 406 hereof."
The constitutionality of the five-year provision has been upheld. Lapides
v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
355 1940 Hearings 505.
35654 Stat. 1171 (1940), as amended, 55 Stat. 743 (1941), as amended,
56 Stat. 779 (1942), as amended, 58 Stat. 747 (1944), as amended, 59
Stat 544 (1945).
357This provision was repealed in order to avoid dependence upon the
operation of foreign law and because positive provisions had been made
relating to election of citizenship by dual nationals. S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 767 (1950). However, its purpose may still be served
where treaties are in effect
8 66 Stat 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1958).
359Although the 1940 Act contained no similar provision, this reasoning
had been applied to it. Matter of W., 3 I. & N. Dec. 860 (BIA 1950).
3860 The 1940 Act did not make clear whether residence in several foreign
states during the period would work expatriation. Since it provided that the
foreign residence must have been continuous, it would appear that the foreign
residence must have been continuous in one foreign state. S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 753 (1950).
36154 Stat. 1170 (1940). Section 101(g) of the 1940 Act, 54 Stat 1137,
defined the term "minor" as a person under the age of twenty-one. As
did § 401 (a) of the Act, this provision embodied the principle of the unity
of the family. 1940 Hearings 503.
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act with the modification that such a child is granted
until age twenty-five to establish a residence in the United
States before American nationality can be lost. The child
is also subject to such a requirement if the parent is a
dual national and has lost American nationality by seeking
or claiming the benefits of the foreign nationality.3 6 2  It
should be noted that a "child" was not defined in the loss
of nationality provisions of the 1940 Act.36 3  The current
act defines a "child" for citizenship, naturalization and
expatriation purposes, 3" as an unmarried person under
twenty-one years of age, and includes legitimated and adopted
children under certain conditions. 65
Continuity of Foreign Residence
The 1940 Act contained no indication as to what con-
stituted continuous residence. Difficulty in applying this
term to nationals who had taken up foreign residence arose
from the fact that such nationals broke the continuity of
their foreign residence by trips to another foreign country
or by a short visit to the United States.3 6  As a result, the
current act contains a provision that residence is to be
regarded as continuous for the purpose of this section
even though continuity of stay is interrupted by physical
presence in another foreign state. 6 7 Once a naturalized
citizen has established residence abroad, a return to this
country for brief temporary visits,36 or for the sole purpose
362 66 Stat. 272 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1487 (1958).
363 However, there was such a definition limited to the nationality through
naturalization provisions thereof. Section 102(h) provided: "The term
'child' includes a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence
or domicile, whether in the United States or elsewhere; also a child adopted
in the United States, provided such legitimation or adoption takes place
before the child reaches the age of sixteen years and the child is in the
legal custody of the legitimating or adopting parent or parents." 54 Stat. 1138
(1940).
364 The 1952 Act also contains a definition of a "child" for those provisions
of the statute relating to immigration matters only. 66 Stat. 171 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1958).36566 Stat. 171 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (1958).
366 S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 767 (1950).
36766 Stat. 170 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1958).
368 Strupp v. Herter, 180 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Matter of C.,
3 I. & N. Dec. 253, 258 (Central Office 1948).
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of retaining American citizenship,369 does not interrupt the
continuity of the foreign residence. The return to the
United States must be accompanied by the establishment of
residence in this country. If this is done, a new period
-will commence.170  Hence, one who had returned to the
United States to seek employment and had remained in
this country for five months before again proceeding abroad
was held to have interrupted the continuity of his foreign
residence.37 1  In this connection, actual physical presence
is strong evidence of residence, particularly when one has
no settled place of residence. 7 2  As with the other grounds,
expatriation by foreign residence must be voluntary. Nation-
ality was not lost where the foreign residence beyond the
time limits specified in the statute was involuntary, e.g.,
where the naturalized person had made all arrangements
to return to the United States but was precluded from
doing so because of transportation difficulties, 373 where con-
sular officers had refused to issue a passport,37 4 where
the person was prevented from leaving the foreign state
because of refusal of officials to permit her to do so, 375
where the foreign residence was prompted by a daughter's
belief that it was her duty to remain and take care of her
369Matter of C., 4 I. & N. Dec. 421 (Central Office 1951). See also
United States v. Cuccaro, 138 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), where
it was held that one was expatriated despite the fact that in connection with
his employment as a steward on a foreign vessel, he maintained temporary
lodgings in the United States which he used as a place to sleep between
voyages.
370 Matter of C., supra note 369.
371Talbot v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 182 (D.D.C. 1951). See Matter
of C., stpra note 369, in which even a period of three weeks was stated
to be sufficient for this purpose.
372Garlasco v. Dulles, 243 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1957). See Strupp v.
Herter, supra note 368, where the plaintiff resided in hotels while in the
United States and while abroad, he resided in hotels, at the home of a
friend and at a house on which he held a mortgage. Since he had been
abroad for all, except almost one year, of the five-year period involved,
the court found that he had resided abroad, but continuity of foreign
residence was not established.
373Matter of V., 2 I. & N. Dec. 816 (BIA 1947); Matter of C., 2
I. & N. Dec. 889 (Central Office 1947).
374 Matter of R., 6 I. & N. Dec. 15, 19 (BIA 1953).
375 Matter of S., 9 I. & N. Dec. 711, 714 (Ass't Comm'r 1962).
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ailing mother,3 76 and where the naturalized person was
misled by a government official into remaining abroad31 7
The burden of proving residence abroad and its con-
tinuity is upon the government." 8 If the continuity is
interrupted by a brief stay in the United States, the govern-
ment has the burden of proving that such a sojourn did
not break the continuity of the foreign residence.3 7 9  It is
to be noted that this method of loss of nationality is not
included in the age restrictions.8 " Accordingly, the com-
mon-law rule is applicable and not only may a person under
the age of twenty-one not be expatriated under this statute,
but the prescribed periods of foreign residence must be
accumulated after attaining twenty-one years of age.8"
Exceptions
To avoid hardships and to promote American interests
abroad, the 1940 Act made certain exceptions for govern-
ment employees and disabled government pensioners con-
cerning the two, three and five-year provisions for expatri-
ation.8 2 Similar exceptions were made only with respect
to the three and five-year provisions in the following in-
stances: for persons over sixty-five who had resided in the
United States for twenty-five years after naturalization:
for employees of specified American organizations; for ill
persons; for certain students; and for spouses and children
of persons residing abroad for statutorily enumerated
reasons. 83 Limited exceptions 384 were also made for per-
376Rykman v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Tex. 1952). See also
Mendelsohn v. Dulles, 207 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1953), where an ill wife
was involved.
377Gay v. Brownell, 120 F. Supp. 319 (D.P.R. 1954).
378Garlasco v. Dulles, supra note 372; Strupp v. Herter, mtpra note 372.
379 Guerrieri v. Herter, 186 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1960).
3880 See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
381 Matter of R., 3 I. & N. Dec. 470 (Central Office 1949).
382 54 Stat.. 1170 (1940).
38354 Stat. 1170 (1940), as amended, 56 Stat 1043, 1085 (1942).
3841n applying that portion of the 1907 Act which related to the procedure
for overcoming the presumption contained therein, the Department of State
had promulgated a series of rules whereby evidence that one came within
many of the classes would have that effect See 3 HACKWORTH, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 310 (1942).
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sons who had acquired American citizenship under the
Organic Acts of Puerto Rico '5 and Guam. 88
In the 1952 Act, classes, substantially similar to those
which the 1940 Act had exempted, were enumerated as
exceptions to both, the three and five-year provisions,38 7
and new classes were exempted from the five-year provision
only."' Intending to liberalize the provisions of the 1940
Act,8 9 the principal changes in the 1952 Act, as amended,
were: 390
1. As to both the three-year and five-year exceptions:
(a) Reduction of the age at which foreign residence
could be established without loss of citizenship
from sixty-five years to sixty years;
(b) Easing of the standard as to American religious
organizations; 391
(c) Broadening of the classes who were residing abroad
because of the ill health or death of a parent, spouse
or child, with certain conditions as to registration
and return; 392 and
38562 Stat. 1015 (1948).
386See 64 Stat. 385 (1949).
38766 Stat 270 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1485 (1958).
388 66 Stat. 271 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1486 (1958), as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1486 (Supp. IV, 1962).
The amendment of §354(a)(5) of the 1954 Act by §3 of the 1959
Act, 73 Stat 274, has been construed to operate retroactively, and to restore
citizenship to persons who did not come within the exemption as originally
enacted and who had already been expatriated thereunder. Matter of N.,
9 1. & N. Dec. 490 (BIA 1961).
389 S. Rp. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 767 (1950).
390In view of the details and complexity of the statutes, it is believed
that better purpose would be served by highlighting the principal changes
rather than detailing the differences between the exemptions to protracted
foreign residence contained in the 1940 and 1950 Acts.
391 This change was made to provide for several religious groups whose
principal office is in some other country, but which, nevertheless, are
recognized American religious organizations. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 767 (1950).
392 The condition as to registration is applicable only to those naturalized
citizens who claim the exemption from loss of nationality iipon the basis
of the ill health of someone other than themselves. If it is the naturalized
person himself who is ill, the registration requirement is not applicable to
him. Matter of A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 619 (BIA 1957).
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(d) More favorable exceptions to persons who became
citizens upon annexation of territory by the United
States;
2. As to the five-year exception only:
(a) Enlargement and liberalization of the provisions
relating to veterans; 393 and
(b) Creation of new classes with respect to persons
residing abroad for purposes determined by the
Secretary of State to be directly and substantially
beneficial to the United States, I" and as to certain
older persons and long-time residents of the United
States.
The exception with respect to persons residing abroad
to represent American organizations was not intended to
be applicable to a naturalized citizen who was residing
abroad and whose representation of the American organ-
ization was incidental. 95 It has been held that it was not
sufficient that a naturalized citizen who owned his own
business in a foreign country could show that the greater
part of his stock was composed of American goods. 96
Nor did one who was an unofficial representative of an
American corporation, but who was not paid a salary or
other compensation come within this exception. 97 However,
where members of a religious organization rendered their
services without fixed compensation, but received general
maintenance from the organization, such general main-
tenance was regarded as substantial compensation and
hence, they were entitled to the exception.398 It should be
393 The 1952 Act contains a definition of "veteran" (for use only in the
loss of nationality provisions) as one who served in the armed forces of the
United States in an active duty capacity during the Spanish-American War,
both World Wars, and the Korean conflict, and who was honorably dis-
charged. 66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1958).
394 Cases involving this provision must be submitted to the Department of
State for consideration. 22 C.F.R. §§ 50.12 (e), 50.13 (d) (1958).
395 1940 Hearings 502.
396 Matter of C., supra note 368, at 256.
397 Strupp v. Herter, supra note 368.
398 Matter of W., 5 I. & N. Dec. 544 (Central Office 1953).
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noted that the burden of proving that he comes within
the exception is upon the person claiming it.3"9
Retention by Persons Born Abroad
There is yet another means whereby citizenship may be
lost. It is not contained in the loss of nationality provisions
of the laws but since it results in expatriation, it is ap-
propriate that it be mentioned. Since 1802, under the
principle of jus sanguinis, statutes have conferred American
citizenship upon a person born outside of the United States
whose father400 was then a citizen and had resided in the
United States. Until 1934 no statute existed which imposed
any requirement of residence on the part of the child, and a
person abroad prior to that date did not have to come to this
country to retain citizenship.40' In the belief that persons
born in foreign countries to parents of different nationalities,
e.g., one parent was a citizen and the other an alien, would
be more likely to have stronger ties with the foreign
country,0 2 Congress, in 1934, annexed as a condition for
retaining citizenship a five-year residence in this country
between the ages of thirteen and eighteen."' This retention
provision was considered in the nature of a condition subse-
quent and, hence, acquisition of American citizenship did
not depend upon fulfillment of the conditions. Such citizen-
ship was acquired at birth subject to loss upon failure
to fulfill the conditions 404
The 1940 Act restated this principle with the modi-
fication that the person was, in effect, given to age sixteen 405
399 Strupp v. Herter, supra note 368.
400 REV. STAT. § 1993 (1878). The Act of May 24, 1934, made a similar
provision where the mother was a citizen to remove the discrimination
against women contained in the statute. 1940 Hearings 421.
401Lee Chuck Ngow v. Brownell, 152 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
See also Rueff v. Brownell, 116 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1953).
402 1940 Hearings 409.
403 48 Stat. 797 (1934).
404 1940 Hearings 421.
40554 Stat. 1138-39 (1940). Enlargement of the age from thirteen to
sixteen was intended to avoid complications resulting from the 1934 Act,
under which, in order to come to the United States at age thirteen, a child
of tender years must have been separated from his parents, or at least
one of them must have accompanied him. 1940 Hearings 421. The ex-
1964 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to come to the United States before suffering loss of citizen-
ship, and made such provision generally applicable to children
born on or after May 24, 1934.400 The 1952 Act sub-
stantially continues this provision but modifies it to the
extent that the time limit for one to come to the United
States has been extended to twenty-three years of age.
Also, a period of five years of physical presence between
the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight is now requisite in
order that citizenship be retained.0 ' It was also made
retroactive to include children born abroad after May
24, 1934, with a savings clause as to the persons who
had already taken up residence in the United States prior
to age sixteen 08 The effect of these retroactive provisions
has been that a person born abroad after May 24, 1934,
has until age twenty-three to come to the United States
and thereafter comply with the physical presence require-
ments.40 9  Moreover, even though such a person had already
lost his citizenship under the 1940 Act by failing to come
to the United States,410 he could regain that citizenship
under the 1952 Act by coming to the United StateT before
eruption from the provision of children born to parents engaged in the
specified occupations was predicated upon the hardships created in such
situations by the 1934 Act. 1940 Hearings 409.
40654 Stat. 1139 (1940).
40766 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1958). The requirement
was changed to physical presence because the residence required by the
1940 Act did not necessarily mean physical presence. S. REP. No. 1515,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 713 (1950).
It should be noted that absences from the United States of less than
twelve months in the aggregate are not considered as breaking the con-
tinuity of such physical presence. See amendment 71 Stat. 644 (1957),
8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1958).
40866 Stat 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1958).
409 Matter of S., 8 1. & N. Dec. 226 (BIA 1958); Matter of M.,
7 I. & N. Dec. 646 (Regional Comm'r 1958). In Lee You Fee v. Dulles.
355 U.S. 61 (1957), the Solicitor General confessed error to the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the case, 236 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1956), which
held that citizenship was lost under the 1940 Act by failure to come to the
United States prior to the age of sixteen, and that the 1952 Act did not
affect such case.
410 Such a situation could have occurred where a person was born in 1935
and had thereafter made no effort to come to the United States, so that
prior to December 24, 1952, he would have been over sixteen years of
age and unable to comply with the retention provisions of the 1940 Act
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he became twenty-three years of age.411 Under the 1952
Act, continuous physical presence is computed on the basis
of the number of hours actually spent in this country each
day whether or not residence here is established.412
As under the general expatriation statutes, one is not
divested of citizenship where failure to comply with the
retention requirements was not the result of his own in-
action or lack of diligence.413 Inability to come to the
United States within the time limit due to conditions
beyond the person's control, e.g., refusal by the State De-
partment to issue a passport,414 mechanical failure of air-
craft,415 or misinformation by government officials, 416 have
all prevented divestiture of American citizenship. More-
over, one over the age of twenty-three years upon arrival
in this country, who had previously been informed that
he had lost his citizenship by failure to return to the
United States prior to his sixteenth birthday in accordance
with the previous view and was thereby prevented from
complying with the physical presence requirements, was
regarded as being constructively present in this country for
the period necessary to meet these requirements. Hence,
his citizenship was retained417 even though an affirmative
expatriating act had been performed, in the meantime, in
reliance upon such erroneous information.418  Nor is nation-
ality forfeited by failure to comply with this requirement
where one did not know that he had a claim to citizenship
411 Matter of M., supra note 409. The administrative view taken prior
to the decision in Lee You Fee v. DulIes, supra note 409, was similar to
that of the Court of Appeals in that case. See Matter of B., 5 I. & N.
Dec. 291 (BIA 1953).412Matter of Bustillos-Ruiz, Interim Decision No. 1243 (BIA 1962);
Matter of Maldonado, Interim Decision No. 1233 (BIA 1962).
It should be noted that one who is serving abroad in the Armed Forces
of the United States is regarded as constructively physically present within
the meaning of the statute. Matter of Szajlai, Interim Decision No. 1252
(Central Office 1963).
413 Matter of L., 4 I. & N. Dec. 639, 643 (Att'y Gen. 1952).
414 Lee Wing Hong v. Dulles, 214 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1954).
415 Lee Hong v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Cal. 1953); Lee Bang
Hong v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 48 (D. Hawaii 1951).
416 Matter of S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 221 (BIA 1958).
417 Ibid. This misinformation must have been supplied subsequent to June
27, 1952, the date of the enactment of this provision.
418 Matter of S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 226 (BIA 1958).
1964]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in such cases, citizenship is not lost until after he has had
a reasonable opportunity to come to the United States
after learning of such claim.419
CONCLUSION
Recent years have seen profound developments in the
field of expatriation. Despite repeatedly expressed Con-
gressional desires to avoid embroilments in relations with
foreign countries and to eliminate dual nationality, the
precious right of American citizenship is being meticulously
protected. There has been more careful scrutiny of all the
facts and circumstances which led to the purported ex-
patriating act. Persons who were unaware that they were
citizens when they performed otherwise expatriating acts
are no longer regarded as having lost American nationality.
The burden of proving expatriation has been imposed upon
him who asserts it. Doubts as to fact and law are being
resolved in favor of citizenship. Desertion from the armed
forces in time of war and draft evasion, both of which
worked a forfeiture of citizenship rights under the earliest
enactment, have been eliminated as grounds for expatriation.
At the present time questions are before the Supreme Court
as to whether provisions for loss of nationality by service
in the armed forces of a foreign state, and by the pro-
tracted residence abroad of a naturalized citizen are proper
exercises of congressional authority. Indeed, the latter
method of expatriati6n is the subject of several pending
bills seeking its repeal or modification 420 upon the ground
that it discriminates between native-born and naturalized
citizens. 421 Unquestionably, more is yet to come.
419 Matter of Yahez-Carrillo, Interim Decision No. 1302 (BIA 1963).
420 S. 1823, S. 1641, H.R. 7982, H.R. 6522, H.R. 4166, H.R. 4159, H.R.
3926, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
421 See 109 CONG. REC. 9236-37 (daily ed. May 28, 1963).
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